Research On The Optimization And Decision Of Healthcare Quality Based On Game Theory

Health is an inevitable requirement to promote the all-around development of people.It is the common pursuit of human society to improve people's health and realize the ideal of receiving medical treatment.Research on the healthcare service system has always been an international frontier hotspot.With the development of science and technology and the improvement of people's living standards,on the one hand,people's demand for healthcare services is increasing day by day.On the other hand,the quality of healthcare services caused by insufficient medical resources has become more and more sensitive and important.Improving the quality of healthcare services is of great significance to saving public health expenditures,improving residents' health,and optimizing healthcare service modes.In recent years,a series of policy adjustments such as improving primary care service capabilities,advancing family doctors' registered services,encouraging the construction of medical consortia,and improving medical service action plans have all focused on improving the quality of healthcare services.At the same time,the application of emerging technologies in the field of healthcare services has also promoted the reform of traditional healthcare service modes.As healthcare service provider,hospitals are facing more opportunities and challenges.In the face of these changes,the government's regulation of hospital behavior and the game analysis behind hospitals and patients are also the basis for scientific planning.Therefore,this thesis sorts out the existing literature related to operation management in healthcare service,from the perspective of healthcare service quality,in-depth study the behavioral strategies of funder,hospitals,and patients.Further,we integrate the application of emerging technologies in the field of medical services to improve social welfare,provide relevant management enlightenment and suggestions for hospitals,funders to formulate strategies.The main research work and content of this thesis are as follows:(1)From the perspective of payment schemes,we consider how to regulate general practitioner(GP)'s behavior through payment schemes,and promote the GP to provide preventive services to improve service quality.We study the performance of payment schemes in encouraging the GP to deliver preventive services,focusing on four different schemes:(i)fee for service(FFS),(ii)capitation,(iii)GP fundholding,and(iv)penalty scheme.We find that the GP fundholding scheme and the penalty scheme are more effective in encouraging preventive service provision in primary care,whereas the other two schemes may result in underinvestment in preventive services.Further,we compare the performance of the GP fundholding scheme and penalty scheme by applying the optimal reimbursement.Both schemes can achieve optimal preventive service strategy to maximize social welfare and generate the same residents surplus.However,compared with the GP fundholding scheme,the penalty scheme can achieve the same incentive effect with lower expenditures for the funder.(2)From the perspective of healthcare service providers,we consider the introduction of emerging technologies such as blockchain to ensure service quality traceably and improve the information asymmetry between hospitals and patients and its impact on service quality.By establishing a competitive model between hospitals,we consider the strategic choice of a hospital to introduce blockchain in the scenario of the homogeneous hospital.The introduction of blockchain will intensify the quality competition between hospitals and improve the quality of hospital services.Interestingly,we find that hospitals that use blockchain do not necessarily provide higher quality of services than hospitals that do not,depending on the amount of reimbursement amount.The size of the reimbursement amount determines whether the strategy adopted by the hospital is based on competitive demand or cost-saving.In addition,the application of blockchain does not necessarily increase the profit of the hospital,although it has gained a higher market share.When the amount of reimbursement amount is low,the positive impact of the credibility brought by the use of blockchain cannot offset the negative impact of fierce competition,especially.Therefore,hospitals may not necessarily adopt blockchain.From the perspective of patient surplus,because blockchain intensifies service competition and improves the quality of medical services,it is good for patients.From the perspective of social welfare,the use of blockchain may not be conducive to improving social welfare.(3)From the perspective of patients,we consider the impact of patients' variety-seeking behavior of healthcare services in multiple stages on the service quality and hospital profits.We establish a two-period Hotelling competition model to compare the equilibrium service quality and demand in different periods.We first discovered two effects caused by patients' varietyseeking behavior behaviors: competition intensify effect and competitive mitigation effect.Variety-seeking behavior incentives the service quality of the second stage higher than that of the first stage.Therefore,by comparing hospital profit,patient surplus and social welfare,we find that the diversity of choice behavior reduces the total profit of hospitals while increases the total patient surplus of the two stages.From the perspective of social welfare,patient surplus is not necessarily beneficial,depending on the marginal quality cost.