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Research On Multiple Incentives Of Q/T/C Under Multiple-model Engineering Project

Posted on:2020-01-11Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y TianFull Text:PDF
GTID:2392330578965686Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The construction of engineering projects is an important infrastructure in China's economic development.The comprehensive benefits of construction projects are the source of power for the owners.The overall utility of a project is often composed of multiple control objectives of the project.In the process of project construction management,supervision and incentives are two important management segments.In the research of traditional project on incentive problems,non-incentive targets are usually treated as fixed values.However,in the actual project construction process,the project's control objectives are mutually influential.The shortened construction period will often lower the project quality,and the improvement of project quality will also cause cost increase on the project.Therefore,when setting the incentive mechanism,the project control target should be considered.The mutual influence,the incentive to a certain control target may not achieve the best overall benefit of the project.At the same time,in the previous research on incentive optimization,considering each control target as a continuous value does not corresponded to engineering practice.In view of these problems,this paper studies the optimization of optimal incentives and the selection of contractor construction schemes under the premise of multi-mode construction scheme and the multiple incentives of quality,construction period and cost.First,build multiple incentives of Q/T/C under multiple-model engineering project.For a multi-model construction project,a stackelberg game model is established based on cost-plus-fee contract,on considering the use of quality incentive,duration incentive and cost incentive,with the goal of the owner's comprehensive utility and the contractor's revenue maximization.Second,A double-level nested optimization algorithm is designed based on genetic algorithm.Considering the structural characteristics of the optimization model and based on the principle of genetic algorithm,a double-level nested optimization algorithm is designed to solve the model,and a corresponding program is developed.Third,the validity of the model and the feasibility of the algorithm are verified by calculating examples,and the calculation results are analyzed and discussed.The research results can provide reference for project managers to improve project management performance.
Keywords/Search Tags:Engineering project, Multi-model, Multiple incentives, Genetic algorithm
PDF Full Text Request
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