Research On Collusion Behavior And Preventive Measures Of Supervising Units And Construction Units In Engineering Projects

The project supervision system is an emerging system introduced into the international market in China in the 1980 s.In the construction market,the construction side of employer,supervision unit and construction side of contractor are the three main bodies for the construction project.The construction side of contractor and the construction side of employer will sign the contract to construct the project,because the construction side of employer and the construction side of contractor have different emphasis on the project.The construction side of employer may have less knowledge of the management of the construction phase of the project.In order to ensure the smooth progress of the project,it is necessary to find a suitable supervision unit in a commissioned manner instead of the construction side of employer to supervise and control the construction side of employer.However,all parties to the project are independent and rational economic agents.Pursuing their own best interests is the ultimate goal of all parties.Moreover,there is a large asymmetry in the power and income among the three parties to the project of the supervisory unit.Because of the large asymmetry of power and income in this kind of supervision,the possibility of collusion between the supervision unit and the construction unit is given.In order to understand more deeply the collusive behavior of engineering projects in the implementation stage,this paper uses game theory as a tool,mainly through three dimensions of research to analyze the collusion behavior that may occur to the three parties of the project construction phase.Dimension 1,the static model is used to study the influencing factors of collusion formation.Through the analysis of the actual case,the parameters of the factors influencing the collusion are abstract,including : conspiracy income,collusion loss,punishment coefficient and supervision cost.The game model is constructed with abstract parameters,and then based on the idea that all parties involved in the project are bounded rational economics,the game model is analyzed,and the probability of construction sideof employer selection supervision and the probability of collusion selection collusion is obtained.Algebraic relationship of parameters.Dimension 2,based on the dynamic evolutionary game theory,studies the evolutionary trends of both sides with the game.In the construction process of the project,the game process between the construction side of employer and the collusion is repeated many times.Therefore,the model of the dynamic evolution game is introduced,and the game evolution trend of the construction side of employer and the collusion is studied by copying the dynamic evolution method.MATLAB performs simulation analysis to further to verify the correctness of the resulting game trends.Dimension 3,propose corresponding countermeasures against the causes of collusion.In the process of research,it is found that the lack of a direct understanding of the reputation loss of enterprises is an important reason for companies to choose collusion.Therefore,this paper builds a reputation quantitative model.The reputation loss that a company chooses to collude may be measured in the form of economy.It is an intuitive understanding of reputation loss,so as to reduce the probability of collusion.Furthermore,according to the influencing factors in the game model,the prevention measures to change the influencing factors to reduce the collusion behavior are proposed.