Research On Negative Strategic Behaviors Of Grassroots Government In Distorted Environmental Monitoring Data

Building ecological civilization is a millennium plan for the sustainable development of the Chinese nation? we have to treat the ecological environment like life?the country implements the strictest ecological environment protection system?and fighting environmental pollution,we must improve the level of environmental governance...These rigorous and purposeful sentences indicate the state's attitude towards ecological environment governance in recent years.At the same time,environmental monitoring data plays a vital role in ecological environment governance.Whether it is the formulation of government environmental governance policies,the commitment of corporate emissions permits,or even the protection of the public's right to know environmental protection,it needs the promotion of real and effective environmental monitoring data.However,the cases of "distortion of environmental monitoring data" exposed through television news,online media and other channels are not rare.Especially after the Party Central Committee and the State Council issued three orders and five applications to ensure that the environmental monitoring data is accurate and authentic,and after the Ministry of Ecology and Environment notified the “2016 Xi'an Environmental Monitoring Data Fake Cases”,people are very worried about the status of ecological environment governance.This article selects three cases based on the differences in negative strategic behaviors in the distortion of environmental monitoring data at the grassroots level.The first is the spatial strategy.In order to complete the task of combating pollution prevention and control arranged by superiors,Henan Pingdingshan Government relocated gas stations operating within 2 kilometers of the state-controlled air quality automatic monitoring station.Before the relocation is completed,the operating hours need to be changed from 19:00 to 8:00 the next day.This is to influence environmental monitoring data through spatial strategies.The second is the time strategy.The Lanshan District of Linyi City,Shandong Province,shut down production and production in a unified manner in response to an inspection by its superiors to “remove the secretary of the township party committee that ranks thebottom two within five days.” This is to influence environmental monitoring data through temporal strategies.The third is the data strategy.The director of the environmental monitoring station in Chang'an District of Xi'an instructed and instructed the staff to block the monitoring probe of the monitoring station with gauze,sprinkle water on the monitoring probe,and delete the video of the monitoring station.Directly manipulate the collected data to affect the collection of environmental monitoring data.This article considers that the spatial,temporal,and data strategies formulated by the grassroots government directly or indirectly lead to artificial changes in the monitoring data.This article refers to these behaviors that attempt to influence the environmental monitoring data through human behaviors to achieve the goal of ecological environment governance as negative strategic behaviors.This paper studies the negative strategic behaviors implemented by the grassroots government in environmental governance for environmental monitoring data ranking.The direct manifestations of the grass-roots government's strategic behaviors are weak consciousness,perfunctory coping,poor performance of duties,attention to the situation,improper policies,lack of evaluation,lax enforcement,and punishment.This paper believes that there are four main reasons for the strategic actions of the grass-roots governments.Firstly,environmental policy constraints have softened and guidance effectiveness has declined.The specific manifestation is the lag of the policy system and the unclear content of the policy,which brings difficulties to the governance of the grassroots government.Secondly,the paradox of organizational structure and improper administrative behavior.The specific manifestation is that the grass-roots government forms a conspiracy with the higher-level government and the same level of government departments in the administrative system of our country,and adopts punishment and escrow when facing the illegal actions of social subjects when going downward and outside the system.Thirdly,the cognitive biases and governance effects of the grassroots governments are minimal.The specific performance is whether the role is positioned as the implementer of the superior policy and the supervisor of policy implementation,or focus on the work between the necessity of environmental governance and the urgency of economic development,or the upwardly responsible intergovernmental relationship and meeting the needs of the public,there is a certain deviation in the definition of the relationship between social and social subjects.Fourthly,the assessment objectives are diverse and the motivationand motivation conflict.Pursue political promotion and focus on economic growth.In order to avoid the "one-vote veto" and increase pollution control.The assessment of the above aspects has caused conflicts of interest for the grassroots government.In the end,based on drawing on advanced experience this article puts forward suggestions on how to correct the grass-roots government's strategic behaviors from the inside out to the above reasons.First of all,we should construct a multi-grid regional cooperation involving multiple fields and agents that is tailored to local conditions.Second,according to the conclusion of the game model analysis,set the correction of illegal punishments related to corporate profits and the combination of education and management to increase the cost of illegal activities,clearly implement responsibilities.Third,refine the business capabilities of other entities such as the grassroots government and improve the assessment mechanism.Fourth,mobilize social resources and form a normalized long-acting inspection mechanism that includes internal government supervision at the grassroots level,central environmental supervision and external collaborative supervision.