Research On The Spatial-temporal Evolution And Heterogeneous Governments Synergistic Governance Game Of Haze Pollution

After 40 years of reform and opening up,China's industrialization and urbanization have achieved rapid development,but the ecological environment has also suffered tremendous damage.In particular,haze pollution has seriously threatened the health of the public.Under the background of the country's vigorous promotion of regional environmental cooperation,regional synergy has become a new research hotspot.This paper proves the necessity and urgency of synergistic governance through empirical research.On the basis of this reality,this paper further studies the realization path and guarantee mechanism of regional synergistic governance model from an innovative perspective of government heterogeneity.The specific process is as follows:First of all,this paper uses “social network analysis” to describe the structural characteristics of the spatial correlation network of inter-provincial haze emission in China,and proves that China's haze pollution has a strong spatial correlation effect,which illustrates the necessity of synergistic governance.At the same time,this paper uses “distance synergistic model” to measure the level of synergy in China's haze governance,and demonstrates the urgency of synergistic governance based the low level of synergy.On this basis,the paper further analyzes the effect of the overall structural characteristics of the spatial network on the level of synergy.These researches discover that,from 1998 to 2016,the spatial correlation of inter-provincial haze emission in China presented a typical “central-marginal” network structure.The provinces in the network center were all located in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and the Yangtze River Delta region,playing an important role of “mediator” and “bridge”.At the same time,the network density shows an upward trend,the network grade and network efficiency demonstrate a downward trend,indicating that the spatial correlation effect of inter-provincial haze emissions is increasing.And the synergistic governance level of inter-provincial haze emission has increased from 0.589 in 1998 to 0.595 in 2016,with an overall increase of only 0.006.And the overall spatial correlation structure has a significant impact on the level of synergistic governance of haze emission.The increase of network density,the decline of grade,and the decrease of efficiency would all improve the level of synergistic governance.In general,the strong spatial correlation effect of haze emissions and the low level of regional synergistic governance have become the realistic basis for exploring how to establish a stable synergistic governance model.Second,under the perspective of government heterogeneity,this paper constructs a two-side evolutionary game consisting of the Superior Government and two heterogeneous local governments,which is used to analyze the dynamic evolution path of game system as well as evolutionary stable strategy(ESS)under the three different conditions: non-incentive mechanism,the introduction of compensation mechanisms and the introduction of supervision mechanism.The results show that,due to the heterogeneity of governments and free-riding behavior,the non-incentive mechanism and the compensation mechanism are all invalid mechanisms,which proves that the stable model of cooperation cannot be formed between heterogeneous governments spontaneously.When the Superior Government implements supervision and imposes penalties on non-synergistic party,and the penalty is greater than the free-riding income,it is the only evolutionary stable state of the game system that the local governments choose synergistic strategy.This demonstrates implementing supervision is a feasible mechanism to promote the formation and stability of the regional synergy model.Subsequently,this paper adds the executive body of the supervisory mechanism,the Superior Government,to the game system.Based on the perspective of administrative costs and administrative reputation,this paper constructs a three-side evolutionary game model,and further explores the necessary conditions for the entry into force of the supervision mechanism.The results reveal that,affected by the heterogeneity of the subject,the local governments in the region need the supervision of the Superior Government to establish a stable synergistic governance model.When the Superior Government's penalty for non-synergistic local government exceeds its “free-riding” benefits,and the reputation loss exceeds the administrative costs of supervision,the supervision mechanism can continue to take effect.The above conclusions on the one hand provide a theoretical basis for the establishment of the “supervision-penalty” measures for the Superior Government.On the other hand,these conclusions also reflect that “administrative costs” and “administrative reputation” are important factors affecting the execution of the Superior Government itself.In the case that administrative costs cannot be effectively reduced,the increase of “reputation loss” of the Superior Government can be a feedback mechanism for the public or local governments to restrict the Superior Government.Finally,this paper constructs a three-side dynamic game model composed of the superior government and two heterogeneous local governments.From the input-output perspective,under the premise that the output(local government stability coordination)is fixed,the less the investment(the comprehensive cost of the Superior Government to implement supervision),the higher the efficiency of the supervision mechanism.According to this,this paper demonstrates the possibility of ensuring the effectiveness of supervision in the case that the Superior Government implements supervision with a certain probability,so as to explore an effective way to improve administrative efficiency.The results indicate that reducing the conflict costs of local governments and improving the penalty intensity of the Superior Government are feasible ways to reduce the proportion of supervisory strategy in mixed strategies of the Superior Government.At the same time,this paper draws the formula for calculating the optimal supervision probability of superior government.