Evolutionary Game Research On Fallow Tactics Of Different Types Of Farmers And Government In Heavy Metal Contamination Area

The implementation of arable land fallow in heavy metal contaminated areas is the basic system of our country.Fallow can allow contaminated arable land to recuperate and allow the ecology to be restored.However,in the process of implementing the fallow policy,fallow farming households are vulnerable to subsidy,or farmers receive subsidies but not fallow,which Leads to fallow cultivation did not achieve the desired target of farmland protection.The cause of these problems is the conflict of interests between related subjects.In order to solve this problem,this paper analyzes the behavioral strategies of different types of farmer households and local governments,and constructs an evolutionary game model of fallow strategies for different types of farmer households and local governments.Finding effective countermeasures to resolve conflicts of interest and promote evolution of the game to ideal equilibrium strategies(fallows and subsidies).The main research contents of this article include:The first chapter,introduction.This chapter mainly introduces the research background and significance,and summarizes,analyzes and evaluates the literature on soil heavy metal pollution and fallow cultivation in China and abroad.Explain the research content,research methods and technology roadmap of this article,and summarize the innovation and deficiencies of this article.The second chapter,the definition of relevant concepts and theoretical basis.This chapter explores the concept of farmland,farmer households,etc.And sorts out the fallow basic theories of farmer behavior theory,game theory,incomplete information theory.It lays a theoretical foundation for game analysis of different types of rural households and local governments.The third chapter,analyzes the status quo and problems of fallow in the study area.This chapter first describes the natural resource conditions and socio-economic conditions of Hunan province selected in this case,and then describes the current situation of fallow cultivation in Hunan province.Finally,the problems of the current fallow of cultivated land in Hunan province are analyzed.The fourth chapter,analysis of fallow practices and game relations between different types of farmers and government.This chapter first divides the types of farmer households,and then analyzes the behavioral strategies of game players such as pure farmer households,farmer households,non-farm farmers,and local governments.Then it analyzes the game focus between different types of farmer households and local governments,and lays a foundation for the construction of the Houwen game model.The fifth chapter,evolutionary game between fallow behaviors of different types of farmers and local governments.In light of the game behavior of different types of farmer households and local governments,an evolutionary game model for fallow practices of different types of farmer households and local governments is first constructed to analyze the evolutionary game process and the stable equilibrium strategy.Then,it introduces the supervision mechanism sent by the central government to impose economic punishment as a constraint,further analyzes the evolutionary game model of fallow behavior strategies between different types of rural households and local governments after the introduction of constraints,calculates the value range of the economic penalty amount,and proposes the influencing factors for the evolution of the game system toward the optimal stable equilibrium strategy.The sixth chapter,research conclusions,countermeasures and suggestions.This chapter summarizes the contents of the full-text study.On this basis,it proposes targeted policy recommendations and points out future research directions.