Research On The Incentive Mechanism Of Reverse Logistics Of Electronic Products Based On EPR System

With the rapid development of information technology and the acceleration of electronic product renewal iteration,a large number of electronic waste will be produced in the world every year.If it is not properly recycled and disposed of,it will cause serious waste of resources and environmental damage.Pollutants will also threaten human health.It is imperative to develop reverse logistics of electronic products.The current recovery situation in China is small,recovery is dispersed,the process is not standardized,and there is a lack of management and supervision,etc.Producer responsibility extension(EPR)system has been proved to be scientific and effective by the practice of developed countries since it was put forward,which provides a reference for the development of reverse logistics of electronic products in China.In recent years,the relevant policies issued by the government have confirmed this point.Based on the EPR system,this paper analyzes the game relationship among the subjects involved in the reverse logistics of electronic products,and then establishes an incentive mechanism for the manufacturing enterprises.This is of great significance for enterprises to actively carry out reverse logistics,and is also the basis of this paper.Firstly,this paper explains the connotation of EPR system,introduces the evolutionary game theory and incentive mechanism theory briefly,and the theoretical basis for the following models is established.Next the paper studies the current situation of recycling waste electronic products at home and abroad,then summarizes several main recovery modes.The three main participants in reverse logistics are positioned to establish the foundation for analyzing the benefit game among them.Secondly,the paper studies the benefit game among government,enterprise and consumer in the process of reverse logistics recovery,analyzes their behavior and strategy choice in the implementation of reverse logistics,and establishes a three-way evolutionary game on this basis.An evolutionary game model based on system dynamics is constructed by Vensim PLE software.Then on the basis of evolutionary game analysis,the paper formulates the incentive mechanism of reverse logistics which is composed of government,enterprise and consumer incentive.In the incentive relationship between the government and the enterprise,the recovery level of the third party enterprise is introduced as the observation quantity to optimize the incentive contract.The research on whether the information is symmetrical or not in the internal incentive of the enterprise is carried out,which emphasizes the importance of the enterprise to supervise the employees.In addition to the level of effort,the consumer incentive also introduces the value level of waste goods,which correlates the incentive intensity of enterprises with it.Finally,taking M as an example,using Vensim PLE software to simulate the evolution game process of government,enterprise and consumer on EPR system,this paper analyzes the internal mechanism of government implementing EPR system to implement reverse logistics.The economic incentive contract between government and enterprise is established,and some effective optimization suggestions are put forward.