The Macro Prudential Management,Monetary Policy And Bank Risk-taking

After the 2008 global financial crisis,scholars at home and abroad have extensively discussed and paid close attention to the transmission of monetary policy and the risk-taking of banks.At the end of 2010,the group of twenty nations improved and revised Basel Ⅱ,by the micro prudential supervision idea gradually to the macro prudential supervision of the concept change and to determine the relevant content of Basel Ⅲ.The core content of the Basel agreement Ⅲ is macro prudential supervision.Compared with the Basel Ⅱ which pays too much attention to individual risk,the macro prudential supervision will focus on the prevention of systemic risk.Macro prudential supervision mainly includes two aspects,one is from the time series,the economic fluctuations through the procyclical behavior of financial institutions to reduce the counter cyclical adjustment brought;the other is from the horizontal connection,but also on the relevant infectious macro prudential supervision and restriction of financial risk among financial institutions.In strengthening the countercyclical macro prudential regulation,what is the relationship between monetary policy and macro prudential regulation is pure substitution or complementary complementary relationship,and how to realize the balance between monetary policy and macro prudential regulation?To answer these questions,we need to study further the relationship between monetary policy and risk-taking behavior of banks.To sum up,in the macro Prudential Management,the study of the relationship between monetary policy and risk-taking behavior of banks has very important practical and policy significance.In this paper,the dynamic disequilibrium panel system GMM model is used to analyze the heterogeneity of bank risk-taking channels under the transmission mechanism of monetary policy through the micro data of 25 listed banks in the past 2006-2016 years.The empirical results show that,the bank risk taking behavior of this period has an important influence on the next period,and the influence has apparent sustained in time;the loose monetary policy on bank risk-taking played the role of incentives;the bank risk taking behavior is more sensitive to the quantitative monetary policy;there is a negative relationship between the bank profitability of one time lag and the bank risk taking behavior;the stronger profitability of the bank did not issue its profits into riskier credit,and weak profitability of the bank is eager to improve the current status of the present profit,and aggressively issue its profits into riskier credit;the bank balance sheet business income is higher,its business Behavior is more prone to risk preference;systemically important banks assume higher levels of risk than non systemically important banks.