The Influence Of Macro-Prudential Policy On The Risk-Taking Of Commercial Banks

China’s economy is facing a hundred years of change and COVID-19’s common influence.How can macro-prudential policies achieve financial stability on the premise of ensuring economic growth? On the one hand,China continues to improve the macroprudential policy framework,on the other hand,it delays the implementation of some macroprudential policy standards,and flexibly uses countercyclical macro-prudential policy tools to support economic development.China’s financial market is dominated by indirect financing.On the one hand,commercial banks are important capital intermediaries,on the other hand,they are an important link in the transmission of macro policies,and are related to the stable operation of the financial market as a whole.This paper combs the practice of China’s macroprudential policy,focuses on the relationship between macro-prudential policy and risk-taking of commercial banks,and considers the factors of capital supplement behavior of commercial banks and monetary policy.Based on the existing literature,this paper aims to expand the theoretical model of commercial bank risk-taking and provide new evidence for the relationship between macroprudential policy and commercial bank risk-taking.According to the research purpose,this paper is divided into seven parts.The first part is the introduction,which puts forward the research problems,defines the research content and research methods.The second part is related theories and literature review.The third part sorts out the content of the macro-prudential policy framework and combs China’s macroprudential policy practice.The fourth part is the impact of macro-prudential capital supervision on the risk-taking of commercial banks.This part constructs a local equilibrium model including families,enterprises and residents to analyze the impact of macro-prudential capital supervision and capital supplement on the risk-taking of commercial banks.The empirical results show that macro-prudential capital regulation can effectively reduce banks’ active risk-taking,and capital supplement can significantly promote banks’ active risk-taking,and the promotion effect of capital supplement on banks’ risk-taking has a threshold effect on banks’ capital level.The main types of risk assets of banks include the proportion of credit,financial assets and off-balance sheet items.It is found that capital supervision significantly inhibits the proportion of credit and off-balance sheet items,and capital supplement significantly promotes the proportion of credit and off-balance sheet items.Further analysis shows that different types of capital replenishment tools have different promoting effects on banks’ active risk-taking.The fifth part empirically tests the relationship between macro-prudential liquidity supervision and risk-taking of commercial banks.The regulation of net stable capital ratio significantly inhibits the active risk-taking and passive risk-taking of commercial banks.The quantile regression shows that the estimation coefficient of net stable capital ratio is always negative,and the coefficient value presents the characteristics of an inverted "U" curve that increases first and then decreases.Through the analysis,it shows that the ratio of nonperforming loans to net loans can be restrained,so as to reduce the bank’s active risk-taking ratio.The sixth part analyzes the impact of the interaction between macro-prudential policy and monetary policy under the "double pillar" regulation on the risk-taking of commercial banks.The interaction between macro-prudential policy and monetary policy significantly affects the level of bank risk-taking.When the central bank implements loose monetary policy,the tight macro-prudential policy offsets the effect of loose monetary policy on bank risktaking to a certain extent.The coordination effect of different types of macro-prudential policy tools and monetary policy is different.The interaction effect between macro-prudential policy(broad-based tools and liquidity tools)and monetary policy directly acting on commercial banks is relatively stable,and the interaction effect of household sector credit tools,systemically important banking tools and monetary policy is not stable.The seventh part summarizes the conclusions of the full text and puts forward policy suggestions for the implementation of macro-prudential policy.The innovations of this paper are as follows: first,from the perspective of research,this paper more comprehensively discusses the impact of different types of macro-prudential policy tools on bank risk-taking from different perspectives than previous literature.The macro-prudential policy tools are discussed from three perspectives: macro-prudential capital supervision,macro-prudential liquidity supervision and macro-prudential policy as a whole.Bank risk-taking is divided into active risk-taking behavior Passive risk bearing results and bankruptcy risk level.Second,at the level of theoretical model,implant the bank capital replenishment behavior into the theoretical model in the form of capital cost function,and comprehensively study the impact of macro-prudential capital supervision and capital replenishment on bank risk-taking.Third,at the research method level,based on the IMF macro-prudential survey database(i MAPP),sort out the implementation of China’s macroprudential policy,and measure the overall macro-prudential policy by constructing an index.Fourth,at the practical application level,the macro-prudential policy forms constraints on the expansion of risk assets of commercial banks.Commercial banks actively supplement capital to alleviate capital constraints and reduce the non-performing loan ratio.This study manually collates the data of sample banks supplementing capital with capital tools to study the impact of different types of capital supplement tools on risk weighted assets.