A Study On The Impact Of Non-executive Directors On The Non-Efficiency Investment

With the gradually development and perfection of China’s securities market,the information disclosure system of our country has also gradually become standardized.But the overall quality of information disclosure level still have roomto rise,the low quality of the information disclosure of listed companies will not only reverse leading investors and the public decision-making consciousness and goals,but also delay the robust securities market development speed.The higher the quality of information disclosure,can improve the efficiency of the capital market transfer,so as to guide investors to make reasonable and rational investment choices.As a direct participant in the information disclosure of listed companies,executives have the ability to influence and determine the company’s information disclosure,studies have shown that executives have motivation and behavior to damage the maximization of shareholders’ interests for their own personal gain.So,will executives use their power to interfere and manipulate information disclosure?Will different sources of executive power affect the quality of information disclosure?What kind of influence will it have?In addition,as an important external supervisor of listed companies,media has played an important role in corporate governance in recent years.Will it affect the relationship between executive power and the quality of information disclosure?In order to answer the above questions,this paper first carries out regression and analysis of the research status of executive power,the media supervision and the quality of information disclosure.Then this paper analyzes based on the Principal-agent Theory,the Managerial Entrenchment Theory and Asymmetric Information Theory,combines with the existing literature to put forward hypothesis about the relationship between executives power,media supervision and the quality of information disclosure,and builds the theoretical model.Further,this paper selects the data of A-share Listed Companies on the main board of Shenzhen Stock in 2012-2015 as the research sample,builds the regression model,and conducts an empirical analysis by using a series of analysis.Finally,basing on the empirical outcomes,we obtain the conclusions of this study,and put forward some reasonable suggestions.The results of this study show that:(1)When executives participate in information disclosure,the power they have has an important impact on the quality of information disclosure.Specifically,the greater the ownership power and the expert power,the lower the quality of information disclosure;the structural power of executives has no marked influence on the quality of information disclosure,while the reputation power can improve the quality of information disclosure;(2)As an important external supervisor of listed companies,media has played an positive role in corporate governance and it can positively regulate the relationship between the executives power and the quality of information disclosure.Specifically,the stronger the supervisory role of the media,the weaker the negative relationship between the expert power and the quality of information disclosure,the weaker the negative relationship between the structural power and it,the stronger the positive relationship between the reputation power and the quality of information disclosure.But the regulating action of media supervision between the ownership power and the quality of information disclosure is not obvious.On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical test,this paper thinks that we should optimize the governance structure of listed companies,allocate the executive power by reasonable method,and give full play to the internal supervision function of the board of directors,so as to achieve the reasonable control of the executive power to effectively curb the occurrence of personal behavior of executives.At the same time,we should pay attention to play a role in corporate governance with the internal and external mechanism,pay attention to the role of media monitoring,change views on the media fundamentally,and improve the quality of information disclosure,to win the competitive advantage.