Executive Power,media Supervision And The Quality Of Information Disclosure

The investment behavior of enterprises can not only promote their own value creation,but also play an important role in the process of macroeconomic development in china.The investment decision of the enterprise is the core part in the financial decision system of the company.Only the efficient investment activity can realize the maximization of the enterprise value and create the shareholder's wealth.But China's capital market is not perfect,information asymmetry,agency conflicts,the imbalance of information between shareholders and creditors and managers will lead to adverse selection and moral hazard problems,these problems make the interests of shareholders is infringed,and lead to inefficient business investment.Inefficient investment behavior is not only harmful to the operation of enterprises,but also will seriously affect the development of the entire market economy.Therefore,it is imperative to improve the efficiency of investment.The board of directors plays a central role in the process of corporate investment decisions.And the composition and role of board members also profoundly affect the independence and effectiveness of board governance.The research shows that the governance efficiency of the board has a close relationship with the external directors.However,the previous research focuses on the governance effect of the independent directors in the external directors.As the independent directors who make the decision-making science of the board of directors,they also play a role in the listed companies.Important role,however,"vase director" or "human director" in the listed companies are not uncommon,its independence and the role of decision support play by the outside world a greater challenge.In contrast,non-executive directors recommended or delegated by major shareholders and other significant shareholders may be more independent of management,and the regulatory role of management is more significant.In recent years,effective governance has become increasingly prominent and become a board of directors An important part of governance.Then the non-executive directors can give full play to the role of governance,effectively inhibit the enterprise inefficient investment behavior?This paper reviews and summarizes the relevant literatures on the non executive directors,investment efficiency,based on the basic theory of corporate governance,investment theory,this paper explores the inherent relationship and mechanism of non-executive directors and enterprise investment efficiency in this paper,Combined with the realistic background of low efficiency of investment in China,demonstrates the relationship between non-executive directors and enterprise investment efficiency,and puts forward the hypothesis of the nature of property rights and the influence of the two job settings on the relationship between the two.In the aspect of empirical,this paper chooses the data of A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2015 as the sample,and designs the measurement model of the relationship between variables.TThrough data analysis,the non-Excessive and inadequate investment,and examined the nature of property rights,the two positions set in the relationship between the two regulatory effects.The results of empirical tests show that non executive directors have an important impact on corporate investment efficiency.Specifically,first of all,the increase in the proportion of non-executive directors can restrict managerial opportunism behavior,educe the possibility of excessive investment in the enterprise.Compared with the state-owned enterprises,the non executive directors effect on the overinvestment behavior is more remarkable in the private enterprises,Compare with the chairman and general manager by one person,when held by different people,the non executive directors effect on the overinvestment behavior is more remarkable.Secondly,non executive directors also have a good effect for alleviating the shortage of investment,the higher the proportion of non-executive directors,the possibility of enterprises lack of investment is lower.Non-executive directors of private-owned enterprises can exert their own advantages and are more effective than non-executive directors of state-owned enterprises in inhibiting excessive investment,compared to the chairman and general manager,one person served,When two positions are held by different people,non executive directors alleviate the role of enterprise investment is more significant.Based on theoretical analysis and empirical test,this paper argues that listed companies should optimize the internal structure of the board of directors and improve the proportion of non-executive directors.To clarify the qualifications of non-executive directors,shareholders should pay attention to the non-executive directors' ability and quality when appointing non-executive directors Can be relatively diversified,broaden the vision of the board of directors.At the same time,to establish and perfect the corresponding system to regulate non executive directors and management,to prevent non executive directors to receive the"reward" in Listed Companies in various disguised form.Secondly,in the state-owned enterprises,the establishment of a non executive board of directors of state-owned enterprises to optimize the code of conduct of the board governance mechanism,to ensure that non-executive directors in the state-owned enterprises,"bold exercise",the face of sensitive issues can "dare to speak" To play its role in the enterprise investment level.Finally,a reasonable allocation of investment decision-making power,avoid decision-making power and decision-making control of a high degree of unity,to achieve the separation of two staff,to achieve mutual restraint of power,and create a fair atmosphere,so as to create a good environment for the non executive directors function,improve the efficiency of investment.