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Media Supervision、Executive Power And The Information Transparency Of Corporate

Posted on:2016-09-28Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:S HeFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330479481092Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Capital market is actually an information market, investors make the investment decision on the basis of the relevant information and the expected benefits and risks. In order to achieve the efficient allocation of resources, adequate information transparency is crucial. Have high transparency not only can reduce agency costs to some extent, and has great significance in terms of safeguarding the interests of investors. In recent years, with the increase in violations of media reports, the supervision of the media has attracted much attention. On the one hand, the media can effectively alleviate the information asymmetry between the enterprise and the market to some extent by collecting and communicating the relevant information; On the other hand, the media can increase the cost and punishment of corporate management’s violations business by exposing irregularities, which can effectively inhibit the opportunistic behavior of management, thereby enhances the transparency of corporate information.This paper firstly reviewed and summarized the domestic and international literature about media coverage and the quality of accounting information, based on the theoretical of principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory, reputation and stakeholder theory, then proposed several hypothesises and established appropriate models to test them. With the financial restatements samples and their control samples in the time period 2008 to 2010, the paper theoretically and empirically analyzed the impact of media reports on the quality of accounting information of listed companies, and further researched how media reports of managers、government intervention and development level of media affect the governance role of the media reports.The empirical research results show that information disclosure of social responsibility can reduce corporate financing constraints, which is to improve the financing problem of China’s enterprises. Also making company have incentive to effectively promote the level of social responsibility information disclosure, and to improve corporate image, reduce the degree of information asymmetry, further to improve the efficiency of capital market allocation.
Keywords/Search Tags:Information transparency, media supervision, executive power
PDF Full Text Request
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