The Research Of Equity Incentive Effect On Private Listed Company In Zhejiang

The separation of ownership and control is the issue of modern corporate governance,resulting in the problem of principal-agent between shareholders and management.As one of the important ways to solve the principal-agent problem,equity incentive has a long-term incentive effect on management and deep theoretical foundation and rich practical experience in Europe,America,Japan and other developed countries and regions,especially in large enterprises,which have become an important part of managers' compensation incentive.However,in our country,the introduction and application of equity incentive is relatively late.China's listed companies equity incentive management approach(Trial)is introduced until January 1,2006.This document provides a policy basis and protection for private listed companies.Then private listed companies in Zhejiang began to try to implement equity incentives.After that,the number of private listed companies in Zhejiang province have been increasing,the incentive level greatly improved,the incentive mode diversified.Based on the research findings of scholars at home and abroad,this paper puts forward two questions: 1.What is the relationship between the implementation of equity incentive and the performance of private listed companies in Zhejiang? 2.In Zhejiang's private listed companies,which mode has more significant incentive effect between restricted stock and stock option? For solving these two problems,this paper selects 66 private equity incentive schemes of private listed companies in Zhejiang province from 2006 to 2015 as empirical research sample company data.For the first problem,we conduct a horizontal comparison between the sample of the implementation of the equity incentive companies and non-implementation of equity incentive companies,comparing the implementation of the equity incentive in the same companies with the method of paried sample T-test longitudinally.As for anther problem,in this paper,multiple linear regression method is used to carry out regression analysis on the collected sample data,and we can find out the equity incentive model which is more suitable for Zhejiang private listed companies.This paper draws the conclusion from the theoretical summary and empirical analysis.The study finds that: firstly,the implementation of equity incentive has certain effect on the performance of private listed companies in Zhejiang,but the improvement is small and the effect is not obvious.Here are some possible reasons for this situation: First,the effectiveness of the capital market in Zhejiang is weak;Second,the manager market has not yet reached a mature stage;Third,the company has not formed a perfect governance structure;Fourth,the laws,regulations and policies on equity incentive are not perfect.Secondly,,the effect of the restricted stock incentive model is better than the stock option,and the stock incentive effect vary from each other.Here are some possible reasons for this situation: First,the rights and obligations of the two are different;Second,the difficulty of the valuation is different;Third,the Incentive intensity is different.