Management Equity Interval Effect Research Based On The Evidence Of Private Listed Companies In Our Country

Due to the separation of ownership and management in modern enterprises, commissioned-agent relationship formed between owner and managers. Due to information asymmetry and incentive system are incompatible, managers may be more maximize at the pursuit of personal interests, and causing all sorts of agency problems. Under the condition of information asymmetry makes supervision weakness, to pull the behavior of the managers back to the enterprise value maximization as the goal, owner needs to design compensation contracts to link together the interests of the principal and agent. Equity incentive system is the most direct embodiment of this. Equity incentive have been since the implementation of the attention of the theoretical and practical circles, among these researches home and abroad, Equity incentive effects on performance of listed companies has been a major research questions. The vast majority of scholars believe that the management equity incentive and enterprise operating performance are related, only a handful of scholar's research shows that equity incentive is not correlation with company performance.This article attempts through a combination of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, verifying managers shareholding in the company's performance at the same time the incentive effect and defense effect, also examining the effect of two kinds of comprehensive effect, to reveal the managers shareholding interval effect, finally find a reasonable management equity level, to provide some empirical evidence for the establishment of management incentives.This article selects private listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as samples, which implements equity incentive policy during year 2012 to 2014. After a certain step of screening, finally keep a total of 2196 sample data. The performance of private listed company in our country is obtained by principal component analysis of composite scores as explanatory variables, management equity ownership of the company's total equity ratio as explained variable, at the same time introducing the control variable, establishing Panel regression model, To test the management equity incentive effect on China's private listed company's performance. In the end of this paper, this article does a careful case analysis with Shanghai JiaHua company.Research findings show that management equity incentive and corporate performance was significantly positive correlation, and management appropriate proportion holding significantly improved the company's performance. The relationship between management ownership and the performance of private listed companies in our country turns out to be positively n-type curve. With the addition of the rate of managerial ownership, incentive effect and defense effect trading off and taking turns to the change of the company's performance. And putting forward four Suggestions accordingly to provide the reference for the practice.