An Empirical Analysis Of The Effects Of Equity Incentive On Corporate Performance In State-owned Listed Corporation

With the deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises,how to adapt to the change of the new normal state economy as the dominant position of the national economy,has become an important issue in the development of state-owned economy.Especially since2005,China began to implement the split share reform,the property rights of state-owned enterprises will became clear gradually,the boundary between the tradable shares and non-tradable shares will gradually be eliminated.It plays an important role to promote the reform of the state-owned enterprises in China.Since 1990 s,China has a series of enterprises to implement equity incentive in succession,mainly in state-owned companies,especially the state-owned listed companies.However,the effect is not Satisfactory because of the constraints of various factors.With the continuous improvement of the law and market environment in our country,the equity incentive as a modern enterprise incentive system will have a brilliant future.Therefore,this article will analyze the existing equity incentive research.Combining the theory of equity incentive,making assumptions on the relationship between ownership of state-owned listed enterprise incentive and performance,establishing the data model to verify the hypothesis,it will provide valuable advice for the state-owned listed companies to implement equity incentive.