Research On The Effect Of Excutive Incentive On The Effectiveness Of Internal Control In State-owned Listed Companies

State-owned enterprises are an important part of China's market economy.Owner vacancy and insider control often occur because of the complex multi-level principal-agent chain.In order to maximize the value of enterprises and shareholders and make the interests of executives and owners align,we need to design a scientific and rational incentive mechanism for executives.Effective incentive mechanism can promote executives to build a scientific internal control system and implement effective internal control system.Therefore,the main purpose of this study is to explore the effect of executive incentives on the effectiveness of internal control in state-owned listed companies.,and systematically integrate the effects of different incentive modes alone or in coordination according to the empirical results,so as to help enterprises rationally allocate incentive modes,reduce the cost of principal-agent and promote the effective implementation of internal control system.Firstly,this paper summarizes and combs the relevant literature on the effectiveness of executive incentives and internal control at home and abroad,expounds the concept and theoretical basis of the effectiveness of executive incentives and internal control,and analyses the current situation of executive incentives and internal control evaluation reports and the disclosure of internal control defects in state-owned enterprises in China.Secondly,based on the theoretical basis,this paper puts forward the hypothesis of this study,and takes the state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from2015 to 2017 as the research sample,establishes the multiple regression model of the effect of executive incentive on the effectiveness of internal control,and makes empirical analysis with SPSS software.It draws the following conclusions: executive incentive,equity incentive and political promotion incentive of state-owned listed companies will significantly enhance the effectiveness of internal control;Political promotion incentive and salary incentive play a complementary role to promote the effectiveness of internal control;At the same time,political promotion incentive indirectly affects the effectiveness of internal control through the substitution effect with equity incentive;In addition,thehigher the proportion of state-owned shares,the more unfavorable the implementation of salary incentive is to the effectiveness of internal control,the reduction of state-owned shares of state-owned listed companies will significantly improve the effectiveness of internal control.Finally,based on the empirical conclusions,the paper puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to improve the executive incentive mechanism and internal control.