The Influence Of Corporate Governance On The Risk-taking Behavior Of China's Listed Banks

Finance is the core component of China's economy,which plays an important role in China's economic stability. With the development of economic globalization,the problem of financial risk is becoming more and more serious. Therefore,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the impact of corporate governance on the risk-taking behavior of banks.In this paper, the impact of corporate governance on the risk-taking behavior of banks is studied. In theory, from the four aspects of ownership structure, salary incentive, the characteristics of the board of directors and the board of supervisors,the paper analyzes the impact of corporate governance on the risk-taking behavior of banks. In the empirical aspect, this paper takes the data of 16 listed banks in China from 2008 to 2015 as the sample, and empirically analyzes the impact of corporate governance on the risk-taking behavior of listed banks.The empirical analysis is divided into three parts. The first part is based on the data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, taking the data of the 53 commercial banks in 2008-2015 as the sample to measure the cost efficiency and technical efficiency of China's commercial banks. Methods to measure the second part different from the existing research of bank risk-taking behavior, based on the structural equation model, combined with the camels rating system (CAMEL) to 53 commercial banks from 2008 to 2015 data as the sample, measure the risk of China's commercial banks taking behavior. In the third part, based on the panel data regression analysis method, taking the data of the 16 listed banks from 2008 to 2015 as the sample,this paper studies the influence of corporate governance on the risk-taking behavior of banks. The first part of the empirical results show that, the overall level of China's commercial banks' cost efficiency and technical efficiency from 2008 to 2015 is still high, especially technical efficiency. The second part of the empirical results show that: bank risk-taking behavior score is higher, the smaller the risk commitment. The third part of the empirical results show that ownership concentration (the first big shareholder ownership and listed banks risk-taking behavior is significantly positive correlation, the former top ten shareholders ownership and listed banks risk-taking behavior is significantly positive correlation)is positively correlated with the listed banks risk-taking behavior, equity balance degree and listed banks risk the behavior is negatively correlated; executive compensation and listed bank risk taking behavior is significantly reversed U; the size of the board of directors and listed bank risk taking behavior is positively related to the proportion of independent directors and listed bank risk to bear is negatively correlated, while the annual number of board meetings and listed bank risk taking behavior are positively correlated, but not significant; the size of the board of supervisors and listed bank risk-taking behavior has a significant negative correlation relationship, in the annual number of meetings of the board of supervisors and listed bank risk-taking behavior has not significant negative correlation relationship; bank assets and listed bank risk-taking behavior has a significant negative correlation relationship, there is no "too-big-to-fail"phenomenon. Based on based on the analysis of the empirical results, this paper puts forward four countermeasures and suggestions: reduce the concentration of ownership, raise equity balance degree; improve the executive compensation incentive mechanism; control the board of directors and board of supervisors scale,reduce the proportion of independent directors; improve the quality of the board of directors meeting and the board meeting.