Research On The Impact Of China's Commercial Bank Governance On Risk-taking Behavior Under Capital Supervision

Before the year of 2008,the trend that financial supervision tends to relax halted caused by the excessive prosperity of the financial market since the outbreak of the financial crisis,the financial sector once again focused on financial regulation and bank governance.With the formulation and promulgation of the Basel Capital Accord which is to make up the loopholes in supervision,the "China version of Basel ?" has been worked out for our specific national conditions.However,profit-driven capital attribute is its essential attribute,with the strengthening of capital regulation,bank risk-taking behavior does not seem to be completely suppressed,meanwhile the previous financial crisis once again indicates that this behavior cannot be suppressed forever.Apparently it is of great significance to study the risk-taking behavior of commercial banks,which is the core institutions in the financial system.At present,there are many researches on the relationship among bank risk-taking,bank governance and capital regulation at home and abroad.However,there are few studies putting the three parties together under the same framework.The corporate governance of any country's commercial bank is bound to be under the capital supervision of the country.Meanwhile,the research on the effect of capital regulation is also difficult to separate from the internal governance of the bank.Therefore,it is reasonable and necessary to study the effect of bank governance and risk-taking behavior under the capital regulation.This paper mainly uses the theoretical and empirical analysis method to analyze the relationship between the governance of commercial banks and risk-taking behavior under capital supervision.Firstly,on the basis of collecting and summarizing literature home and abroad about the relationship among risk-taking behavior,bank governance and capital regulation,the paper defines the related concepts.And then analyzes the internal governance framework and current situation of our country's commercial banks.Focusing on the new regulatory requirements of the Basel Capital Accord ?,the paper elaborates the development process of the Basel Capital Accord and the innovation of the regulatory framework,and describes the new requirements of banking supervision in China.The paper deeply analyzes the impact of internal governance on risk-taking behavior under capital regulation environment by using the research on the related theory of Jeitschko and Jeung model,and puts forward the hypothesis of this paper.Finally,we use the data from 17 domestic banks in 2008 to 2016,and make panel analysis based on two latitudes of risk beforehand and ex post assets risk,and draw conclusions and related policy recommendationsThe empirical analysis shows that:(1)For risk-taking tendency,enhancement that leverage ratio on bank risk behavior is significant when the concentration of equity is higher in the sample of joint stock bank.Board of directors governance is more significant on G-SIFIs under capital adequacy regulation and on CIFIs under leverage ratio regulation.(2)For post-asset risk,capital adequacy regulation and leverage ratio regulation play a significant role in reducing the GSIB bank's bad debt ratio with the increase of ownership concentration.The two forms of regulation do not play a supervisory role in the risk of GSIB bank assets.The role of the leverage ratio under the supervision of the CIFIs is more significant.Therefore,it is suggested that the internal governance structure of the bank should be perfected,the differential supervision of different types of banks should be implemented and the regulation of leverage ratio should be strengthened.