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Managerial Power,Institutional Investors And Inefficient Investment

Posted on:2017-12-21Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H T WuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330512974513Subject:Financial management
Abstract/Summary:
Investment as one of the most important activities of the enterprise,related to the survival and development of the entire enterprise.Corporate investment efficiency are closely related to managers’ decision-making.However,due to the presence of asymmetric information and principal-agent problem,at present,Inefficient investment in China’s listed companies is widespread:excessive investment and insufficient investment.Especially after the financial crisis,corporate over-investment and under-investment behavior is more serious,which highlights the important role of internal and external governance mechanisms.In recent years,with the split share reform basically completed and the State"extraordinary development of institutional investors" policies,institutional investors develop rapidly,and effective mechanisms for its positive role in the capital market get more and more attention and recognition.But theorists and practitioners still exists controversy for Corporate Governance of Institutional Investors:Studies have shown that institutional investors play an active role in corporate governance,but some researchers also showed that institutional investors have no influence in corporate governance.Therefore,this article as a breakthrough,Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share listed companies between 2011-2014 data as a sample,based on research of managerial power and inefficient investment,inspect the role of institutional investors in the relationship between the two.On this basis,inspect the role of stable institutional investors and transactional institutional investors play if differ.This study includes the following six parts:The first part is an introduction.This section introduces the theoretical and practical background and significance of the research of this article describes research methods and research purposes,and a brief idea of the overall framework of the article,as well as description of the innovation of this paper.The second part is the literature review.Include managerial power,managerial power and Inefficient Investment,the effect of institutional investors participating incorporate governance,institutional investors heterogeneity related literature,literature review and combing,and on the basis of the literature are reviewed.The third part is the relevant theories and hypotheses.This section first defines institutional investors(including its heterogeneity),managerial power,inefficient Investment of these three concepts,and then put forward the theoretical basis of this study,including the principal-agent theory,manager theory,stakeholder theory and cost-benefit theory.Finally,analysis the mechanism and propose the hypothesis on the basis of relevant theories.The fourth part is the research design.This part mainly include:select the study sample and data based on assumptions,establish the research model,select the study variables.The fifth part is the empirical test and the result analysis.Basing on the sample,this paper carry out descriptive statistics,correlation analysis,regression analysis and the robustness test.The sixth part is conclusion and suggestion.This part is to summarize empirical research results,give some suggestions,point out the shortage of this article and indicate the development direction of the future research.According to the results of empirical research,managerial power and inefficient investment had significant positive correlation,indicating that managerial power worsens inefficient investment.After the introduction of institutional investors,the positive correlation between managerial power and inefficient investment have been weakened,institutional investors could ease inefficient investment caused by managerial power.Furthermore,considering the heterogeneity of those institutional investors,found that compared with transactional institutional investors,stable institutional investors eased the positive correlation between managerial power and inefficient investments.This suggests that different institutional investors have different effects.Innovation of the this paper is the novel research topics and deepen research:the institutional investors,managerial power,inefficient investment are included in one model,inspect the role of institutional investors in the relationship between managerial power and inefficient investment.Further more,inspect the role of stable institutional investors and transactional institutional investors play if differ.
Keywords/Search Tags:Managerial Power, Institutional Investors, Inefficient Investment, Institutional Investors Heterogeneity
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