| Investment, as one of the troika to promote economic growth, it plays a crucial role in the development of whether for business or for the national economy, but the current investment efficiency is very low, one of the main reasons is that business managers’ investment blindly in order to pursuit of scale. However, due to the imperfect system of corporate governance and lack of internal control systems, the inefficient investment behavior emerged in endlessly, so how to govern the inefficient investment issues caused widespread concern of practitioners and academics. With the introduction of ‘extraordinary development of institutional investors’ policies, institutional investors have been greatly developed. However, there is little literature research the relationship of institutional investors, managerial power and corporate non-power efficiency. Therefore, as an opportunity, select the A-share listed companies’ data in 2010-2013 as a sample, based on the effect of the managerial power to inefficient investment, whether the relationship between managers power and inefficient investment vary as institutional investors to join. Further, examined the different types of institutional investors-the pressure-resistant institutional investors and the pressure-sensitive institutional investors whether they played the same role.The empirical results prove managerial power and non-efficient investment showed a stronger positive correlation, but with the join of institutional investors, the positive correlation decreased to some extent, after the study the different institutional investors found that the pressure-resistant institutional investors can weaken the positive correlation of managerial power and non-efficient investment, but the pressure-sensitive institutional investors did not play such a role. So the effect of different types of institutional investors is different. Based on the above findings, the article proposes some policy suggestions. |
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