Empirical Study On Relationship Among Institutional Investors, Nature Property And Inefficient Investment

In recent years, the institutional investors on the relationship between InefficientInvestment has become a hot research topic in the field of. Institutional investors isthe majority shareholder of the listing Corporation, often through enough votingpower to exert pressure on the managers, or even through the dealership competitionand over to recall the managers, effectively solve the agency problem. Especially inthe mature capital market, institutional investors often can exert important influenceon the supervision mechanism of the corporate governance, to become a reliablemechanism to solve the problem of corporate governance (Black,1992). A part of theresearch that institutional investors participate in the corporate governance role of thefinite and the institutional investors in China is still in the initial stage of developmentassets scale is small, the capital market is not perfect the relevant. However, anothersome scholars believe that as institutional investors in China to expand the scale ofassets and capital market reform, more and more research that institutional investorsshareholdings and the value of listing Corporation are related, and may become thesubject of a qualified company supervision.Therefore, to investigate the relationship between the two can not be wellexplained the institutional investors influence on Inefficient Investment of investment.Despite the impact of scholars from the structure, cash flow of equity, theprincipal-agent relationship between the direction of institutional investors on theInefficient Investment of investment, but there is no special period from theperspective of property rights relationship research to study the nature of the two.China is in the economic transition, the present stage our country listing CorporationChina coexist enterprises and non state owned enterprises, and the governancemechanism of state-owned and non state-owned enterprises incentive mode, mode ofoperation, within the property and facing external challenges have bigger difference. Therefore, this paper introduces the nature of property right of this variable, to studythe regulation effect of institutional investors under the action of the inefficientinvestment in state-owned and non state-owned situation, to enrich the existingresearch on the relationship between institutional investors and inefficient investmentof investment behavior.This paper selects2011to2013in Shanghai and Shenzhen300index of thelisting Corporation as a sample, using Richardson (2006) model to measure nonefficiency of investment, with the proportion of institutional investors holding andperiod of institutional investors as index, the introduction of property rights as amoderating variable, transported by multivariate linear regression analysis, theinfluence of China’s state-owned and non state-owned listing Corporation ofinstitutional investors on the Inefficient Investment of investment.The empirical results show that, the institutional investor shareholding ratio andthe Inefficient Investment investment holding period and the enterprise a negativecorrelation relationship. Institutional investors holding and listing Corporation andInefficient Investment of investment in a certain range significantly negativelycorrelated; institutional investors holding period and enterprise non efficiencyinvestment negative correlation, namely the holding period is longer, corporateinefficient investment behavior of the lower level. Different types of institutionalinvestors to participate in corporate governance motivation and ability differences,through the development of institutional investors, cultivate the institutional investorsto participate in the listing Corporation governance environment, to encourage listingCorporation to invest rationally and realize value maximization. The nature ofproperty rights has a significant impact on the Inefficient Investment investment, alsohas the remarkable difference to affect the efficiency of investment in InefficientInvestment of investment property after the non embedded. State enterprises andInefficient Investment of investment degree is high, the influence of institutionalinvestors on the Inefficient Investment of investment is significantly weaker than the non state owned enterprises. Relatively speaking, rather than the state-ownedcontrolling shareholders of listing Corporation in general as a natural person orprivate enterprises, constrained and less intervention of government departments,market characteristics are more obvious, so the investment of institutional investorson the Inefficient Investment have the very good control.The conclusion of this paper enriches the research perspective of inefficientinvestments in China, providing a reference for our country to perfect the investmentlisting Corporation.