Research On The Effects Of Institutional Investors To Quality Of Information Disclosure Based On The Deviation Of Two Rights

Disclosure of information is the main way for investors and the public to understand the listing Corporation and make their investment decisions.The importance of information disclosure in the capital market is self-evident.However,the listing Corporation information disclosure fraud,false disclosure and other scandals emerge endlessly,seriously damage the interests of the information users,disrupt the normal order of the market operation,therefore,how to improve the quality of information disclosure of listing Corporation has become the focus of the academic study.Since LLSV(1999)has put forward the concept of ultimate controlling shareholders for the first time and built a LLSV research paradigm,scholars have found that the national listing Corporation governance environment was different from �Berle-Means proposition� period,the ownership structure of listed companies are not so dispersed,but relatively concentrated,this situation is particularly prominent in China's listing Corporation,therefore the phenomenon of ultimate shareholder agency problem come to the surface.These ultimate controlling shareholders who behind the largest shareholders implement various tunneling behaviors through Pyramid control structure,resulting in damage to the interests of minority shareholders.In order to cover the occupation of listed companies,ultimate controller often whitewash information to avoid regulatory penalties,just disclose selective information in accordance with the their interests,resulting in the quality of information disclosure is low.Based from above fact,this paper study the reasons of low quality of information disclosure in listed companies from the view of the ultimate controlling shareholder,in order to deepen the empirical study of information disclosure.At the same time,this paper introduce institutional investors as external supervisors to test whether they could prevent the ultimate shareholders' opportunism behavior,alleviate the agency problem of ultimate controller;What's more,this paper further classified institutional investors into the pressure resistance and pressure sensitive,to examine different types of institutional investors in corporate governance effect differences.This paper uses date of listing companies from 2011 to 2014 as samples.First we examine the impact of the deviation of two rights and other characteristics form ultimate control on the quality of information disclosure,and then we use institutional investors as adjustment variable to study its function to the structure of the ultimate control,and further study the difference of two types institutional investors' governance effectiveness.Empirical results show that:(1)The greater the degree of deviation of the two rights,under the situation that ultimate shareholder or the interests representative of its own work as the core management,the lower the quality of enterprise information disclosure.(2)Under the condition of deviation of two rights,compared with the non institutional investors situation,institutional investors holding enterprises' information disclosure quality is higher.(3)Institutional investors as a whole can ease low quality of information disclosure caused by ultimate controllers.(4)Compared with the type of pressure sensitive institutional investors,the pressure resisting institutional investors alleviate the low quality of the information disclosure caused by the deviation of two rights much better.Finally,according to the empirical results,we put forward policy recommendations for the enterprise to improve the information disclosure system,optimize the ownership structure and accelerate the development of institutional investors.