Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge?Institutional Investors And Accounting Information Disclosure Quality

Equity pledge is a pledge established by the pledgor with the equity held by the pledgor as the object of the pledge.In recent years,the securities market has developed rapidly and shareholder financing needs have been rising.Compared with other financing methods,equity pledge financing is not only simple to operate,but shareholders can also obtain the required liquidity while maintaining control.This unique advantage makes equity pledge financing one of the most common financing methods for listed companies.The scale of equity pledges has expanded rapidly since 2014.According to statistics from Oriental Fortune Choice,as of the second quarter of 2019,companies that have pledged equity in listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen have accounted for 90.59% of the total.The controlling shareholder's equity pledge occupies a large proportion.Although equity pledges provide convenience for shareholders' financial financing,they also bring the risk of control rights being transferred to shareholders.After the controlling shareholder pledged the equity,in order to avoid the risk of transfer of control,they have a strong market value management incentive to manipulate the stock price to prevent a decline.Information disclosure has a direct impact on stock prices,and the pledgor may use opportunistic behavior to manipulate the quality of accounting information disclosure.Institutional investors,as an important external regulatory factor of the company,have sufficient funds and huge personnel,and in order not to harm their own interests,they often have professionals who pay attention to the accounting information of listed companies at all times.Therefore,there is reason to believe that institutional investors are extremely alert to the quality of the accounting information disclosure of the holding company,which can play a regulatory role in the manipulation of accounting information disclosure by the controlling shareholder of the equity pledge.Based on this,this article studies the relationship between the controlling shareholder's equity pledge,institutional investors and the quality of accounting information disclosure,and discusses how they affect each other.It provides a reference for improving the quality of accounting information disclosure,has important practical guiding significance for the regulatory layer to regulate the shareholder's equity pledge,and also provides a basis for the improvement of the internal governance system of listed companies and the improvement of risk management and control.This paper first sorts out and summarizes the relevant documents of the controlling shareholder 's equity pledge,institutional investors and accounting information disclosure quality,analyzes the previous research results,and then proposes based on the principalagent theory,stakeholder theory,information asymmetry theory and other theories.Research hypothesis about the relationship between controlling shareholder equity pledge,institutional investors and the quality of accounting information disclosure.Few people have studied the relationship between the three,this article has some innovations in the content.Then,it selects Shenzhen-listed A-share listed companies for five consecutive years from 2014 to 2018 as research samples,selects appropriate variable measurement methods,and builds regression models.It empirically tests the research hypotheses proposed in this paper.Finally,draw conclusions based on empirical results and put forward corresponding policy recommendations,and point out the deficiencies in the research process.According to the analysis of regression results,this paper draws the following conclusions:(1)The proportion of controlling shareholder's equity pledge is significantly negatively correlated with the quality of accounting information disclosure;(2)The proportion of institutional investors' shareholding is significantly positively correlated with the quality of accounting information disclosure;(3)institutions Investor holdings can suppress the adverse impact of the controlling shareholder's equity pledge on the quality of accounting information disclosure.In response to the above research conclusions,this article also puts forward some policy recommendations at the end.First of all,the supervisory authorities should further standardize and improve the relevant systems,continue to strengthen the management of the equity pledge of the controlling shareholders of listed companies,and put forward higher requirements for accounting information disclosure;second,strengthen the function of institutional investors and give full play to the role of external supervision,Promote the stable development of China's capital market;finally,the company must improve the relevant governance mechanism,prevent the opportunistic behavior of the controlling shareholder,improve the quality of accounting information disclosure,and maintain the company's value.