Large Shareholders Controlling,the Quality Of Information Disclosure And Firm Performance

Now, with the ownership structure of research, scholars have noted that in most countries, ownership concentration is widespread, in the concentrated ownership structure, the controlling shareholders of listed companies may have controlling right over cash flow right held by,resulting in controlling right and cash flow right of separation, directly induced the largest shareholder of an ace of usurpation ,in this case, large shareholders controlling and the interests of the occupation of the issue of corporate governance has gradually become a new focus of attention. The controlling right and cash flow right is the conditions of second agency problem. After the separation of controlling right and cash flow right, controlling right are usually greater than cash flow rights, controlling shareholders can use a smaller stake in listed companies aim to control, resulting in more complex ownership structure,and this facilitate the controlling shareholders to deposit and transfer profit of listed companies. Numerous scholars at home and abroad have analyzed the relationship between corporate performance and the separation of controlling right and cash flow right ,but the research about the constraints of the controlling shareholder encroach on corporate performance under the separation of the two rights is few.Based on this perspective, on the basis of literature review related to this article both at home and abroad, firstly,this paper inspected the constraint effect of the quality of information disclosure to the controlling shareholder encroach on corporate performance under the separation of controlling right and cash flow right from a theoretical perspective,then use Shenzhen A-share market listed companies as study object, select the relevant data for 2006-2008, the composition of panel data, using SPSS13.0 statistical software to empirical analysis the constraint effect of the quality of information disclosure under the separation of controlling right and cash flow right. Empirical results show that the better the quality of information disclosure is, the smaller negative effect of the deviation of controlling right and cash flow right on firm performance, and thus can promote firm performance; In the state-owned corporate, the constraint effect of the quality of information disclosure to the controlling shareholder encroach on corporate performance is very small;And thus in the non-state-owned corporate, the better the quality of information disclosure is, the more constraint effect to the controlling shareholder encroach on corporate performance under the separation of controlling right and cash flow right.Final on the basis of empirical analysis, the paper put forward corresponding suggestion .