Nature Of Property Right,M&A And Executive Rewards

Under trends of economic globalization and fierce competition,mergers and acquisitions(M&A)become the most effective way to improve production capacity,optimize corporate governance,reconstruct the industry chain and achieve business consolidation.With the expansion of capital market capacity,the market of M&A in our country is booming.At the time of rejoicing for thriving of M&A,we can not help doubting about the intentions and results of M&A.Pursuing economic benefits is interpreted as the most significant reason of M&A in the early years.However,with the development of research,academics propose that executives reap high returns through M&A.Whether M&A enhance company value,it is still worth debating.Based on above considerations,I propose the research topic of the M&A's influence on executive rewards.The background of the thriving of M&A and the climbing of executive rewards in China aroused my thinking.Consequently,I review the existing research on the influence of M&A on executive rewards,and comb the theories of principal-agent theory,property right theory and M&A motivation theory,and then put forward the hypothesis that M&A has a positive effect on executive rewards.Since expansion of corporate scale and change of enterprise performance is the direct results of M&A,I sum up following two impact paths.First,M&A lead to the expansion of corporate scale,thereby affecting executive rewards.Second,M&A lead to improving enterprise performance,thus affecting executive rewards.Considering the lagging of performance changing,I study the influence of M&A on executive rewards from two stage,including current period of M&A and later stage of M&A.Since the nature of property right brings an enormous impact to corporate operation and executive conducts,we should take account of institutional context when solving economic issues.Therefore,it is necessary to study the question grouped by nature of property right.Solving this problem not only have practical significance on improving corporate governance and integrating incentive mechanism,but also have theoretical guidance on corporate governance of different nature of property right.This dissertation is divided into the following six parts.The first part is the introduction.This part states the research background and significance,defines the relative conceptions,introduces the research direction and content,describes the research methods,lists the research framework and points out the possible innovation points.The second part is the literature review.I sort the existing studies of relative fields focused on M&A,corporate scale,enterprise performance and executive rewards,and then comb the relationships among those four elements.Through reviewing of literature,I clarify the current research progress and dynamics of M&A's influence on executive rewards,and discover the research gaps and possible improvements in this field.The third part is the theoretical analysis and research hypotheses.Based on principal-agent theory,I propose M&A promote executive rewards effectively by increasing in scale at the year of M&A.Combined with property right theory and motivation theory of M&A,I present the paths of enhancing in executive rewards after M&A.After M&A,executive rewards of Sate-Owned Enterprises increase by scale expansion,however private company executive rewards enhance by performance improving.Furthermore,I divide the State-Owned Enterprises by level of control and come up with the new idea that increasing of executive rewards after M&A at Local Sate-Owned Enterprises is a joint result of performance improving and scale expansion.The fourth part is the empirical research design.I select all A-share listed companies which arose M&A from 2010 to 2013,which the sample span contained year from 2008 to 2015.I build three models based on the hypotheses and explain the definitions and measures of relevant variables.The fifth part is empirical analysis.This dissertation discusses paths which M&A impact executive rewards from two stages under different property right and verifies the hypotheses by empirical methods including descriptive statistics,correlation analysis and multiple regression.Then I confirm the robustness of conclusions via variable substitution.The sixth part is research conclusions and suggestions.Conclusions are summarized in according to the results of empirical research and suggestions are proposed from the aspects of incentive mechanism,investment decision and corporate governance.Simultaneously,deficiencies of this study and future research directions are demonstrated.Based on previous study,this dissertation has following innovations.Firstly,most existing studies are based on short-term performance.Being different from the jump in enterprise scale after M&A,increasing in performance may delays in the short term.To make this research more reasonable and accountable,I divide the study process into two stages including current period of M&A and later stage of M&A.Secondly,considering the variance of property right,I divide the sample by nature of property right and come up with two new viewpoints.For the path of executive rewards enhancing after M&A,private companies achieve by scale increasing,moreover,Local Sate-Owned Enterprises realized by performance improving and scale expansion jointry.