Empirical Research On The Influence Of Executive Connection On M&A Performance

Since the 1990 s,M&A activity has been conducted continuously and frequently in a variety of industries around the world.The international academic community has conducted a lot of researches on the value effect of mergers and acquisitions,but has not yet reached a consistent conclusion.Whether M&A will bring wealth effects to shareholders or creat value has become an important issue in the M&A research.As one of the informal relationship mechanisms,the executive connection relationship can enable the merger and acquisition companies to legally exchange and communicate private information,which can effectively reduce the friction of information asymmetry caused by the formal system,then strengthen the cooperation intention of both parties to the transaction,and promote companies to carry out good M&A integration,which may affect the creation of M&A value.This thesis sorts out the literature on executive relationship and M&A performance,the thesis analyzes the relationship between executive management and M&A performance based on the theory of information asymmetry,resource dependence theory and synergy effect theory,this thesis also examines the impact of corporate governance and property rights on the relationship between executive management and M&A performance based on principal-agent theory and the nature of property rights in China.This thesis uses the 2009-2015 A-share and GEM listed company panel data,firstly conducts a full descriptive statistical analysis of the M&A performance,executives' association and various control variables,then divides the sample into existing executives and the absence of the executive association,and compare the variables of two samples,provide the basis for the subsequent empirical analysis of this thesis.Then use correlation analysis to test the rationality of variable selection.Finally,multiple regression analysis is used to investigate the impact of executive management on M&A performance and the impact of corporate governance and property rights on the relationship between executive management on M&A performance.The results show that,first,the existence of the executive relationship between the two parties can significantly improve the company's short-term and long-term M&A performance.Second,the low level of corporate governance will weaken the positive role of executive management in M&A performance.Third,the state-owned property rights of enterprises will inhibit the positive promotion of executives' performance on M&A performance.This thesis examines the impact of corporate executives on M&A performance from the perspective of executive management,and increases the impact of corporate governance and the nature of corporate property rights,and expects to provide high-quality M&A reference opinions for listed companies in China.