Research On Operator's Incentive And Restrictive Mechanism In China Nuclear Engineering Group

In recent years, massive loss of state-owned assets and state-owned enterprise executives corruption cases show that operator's incentive and restrictive mechanisms in most of our state-owned enterprises are lagging behind, rough formed, and lack of incentive as well as restrictive. Excellent entrepreneurs are seldom found, even worse than those of the private companies. How to stimulate the initiative, enthusiasm and creativity of the state-owned enterprise operators to enhance the enterprise management benefit, and to maintain and increase the value the state-owned assets has become the focus of research in theoretic and business realms.This paper takes the operators of those enterprises which belong to China Nuclear Industry Engineering Group Co., LTD which the author works for as the research object to research its incentive and restrictive mechanism. The research has important theoretical and practical significance: on the one hand, it will help to improve the work enthusiasm, and creativity of the operators, regularize the behavior of operators, reduce agency costs, maintain and increase the value of state-owned assets, and cultivate operator's market and team. On the other hand, it will help us to find those problems underlying our economic environment, thus to provide beneficial references for management environment improving, reform accelerating, and competitiveness strengthening of the state-owned enterprises.This paper combines government policies and regulations and actual situation existing in those enterprises which belong to China nuclear industry engineering group Co., LTD. It concentrates on incentive and restrictive theory of general operator and also benefits from research findings on operator's incentive and restrictive mechanism of enterprises abroad and domestic. Based on principal agent theory and human capital theory, this paper presents deep analyses on operator's incentive and restrictive mechanism of those enterprises and then proposes the method of optimization: the incentive plan of “one plus four”, which includes improving annual salary system, normalizing post-related consumption, improving pension system, implementing stock option incentive and establishing spiritual incentive. In the meantime, this paper also comes up with the idea of optimizing restrictive mechanism, that is, the restrictive plan of “greater supervision”, which includes reinforcing the role of directorate, strengthening the supervision and control function of supervisory board, bringing the party organization supervision into play, enhancing the financial and auditing supervision and exerting the restriction of law. This paper has incorporated the spirit of the government documents on state-owned enterprise reform.Total scale of China Nuclear Industry Engineering Group is not big. Thoughts and concepts, product characteristics and management levels of those enterprises are different from each other with uneven development, Since the study scope is wide with various disciplines involved, errors and omissions might be unavoidable. Further research and development is needed.