| Pollution has the properties of public goods,but pollution control has positive externality.We can’t solve the fundamental problem relying on a province or a city,so as to solving the pollution control problem is the key to protecting the environment and developing regional economic.Firstly,from the perspective of the central government,this paper analyzed that the externality of pollution control would lead to the inefficiency of the market,and the implementing of joint control mechanism for the local government in dominant strategy equilibrium and sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.The study found that:Market efficiency loss came from private information and inadequate supervision of the mechanism designers,and got the sufficient and necessary conditions of implementing mechanism in Nash equilibrium mechanism,also built a dynamic mechanism to realize the joint control of regional air pollution.At the same time,through introducing the asymmetric information,we gave the way to achieve the goal in dominant equilibrium.Secondly,investigated the heterogeneity of local government,and constructed non authoritarian and dictatorial social welfare function,the necessary condition for the existence of the dictatorship of local government were given.Then we designed local government pollution control mechanism of dictatorial and non authoritarian under incomplete information,through the mechanism try to compare pollution policy and empirical results.The conclusion showed that:The local government can not achieve the joint control under the condition of non-supervision.The condition of the existence of dictatorship is that the contribution of the dictatorial local government to the social welfare is greater than the sum of the contribution of others to the social welfare.The pollution control mechanism under the condition of the dictatorship and the dictatorship are both implementable in dominant strategy,but the social welfare of the dictatorship is greater than that of the non dictatorship.In the design of regional joint control mechanism of pollution,the central government should take advantage of the regional advantages of some provinces and cities,and guide some dictatorial local government to play a role in the regional pollution control,so as to achieve the best overall social welfare.Finally,we studied the pollution control mechanism design for participants with private related information,and the mechanism of non collusion execution results in complete and incomplete information were under discussed,and designed the collusion proof mechanism,the implementation mechanism under the condition of incomplete information is given.The results showed that:under the condition of incomplete information,the marginal cost is equal to buy enterprise pollution emissions the marginal revenue and the central government pollution control;under incomplete information,the central government failure in the control of pollution emissions on resource allocation,making high pollution type enterprises to obtain positive information rents,so to reduce the cost of information from high types of enterprises.Under the collusion proof mechanism,when high pollution enterprises conspire,the total pollution control provided by the central government consistent with the best situation;when low pollution type of enterprises conspire,the marginal cost of pollution control of central government had a bearing on the correlation of private information in joint enterprises,and the higher the correlation,the smaller the marginal cost,the lower the degree of difficulty in collusion prevention. |
