Restrictive Industrial Policy And Bank Loan

China needs to change the economic model,Whether it is to consolidate the fruits of economic recovery in the short term or to maintain sustainable economic growth in the long term. Economic development pattern is a profound change, presently, China is in a critical period of reform and development,.Upgrading of industrial structure is the focus of economic concerns. As a national macro-control mode, Industrial policy is an important means to promote industrial upgrading.ther are a lot of studies focusing on the role of the policy itself, or discussing the effectiveness of encouraged industrial policy, but little concerning implementation effect of restrictive industrial policies. This paper attempts to discuss the effect of limiting the perspective of industrial policy under the promotion incentives officials. in order to enrich research in related fields of industrial policy for the future development of policies play a national reference.This paper studies the political promotion to GDP growth incentives under the selection criteria, the impact of the central government issued the suppression of the industrial policy of the enterprise bank loan, according to the ’government hands’ theory by Shleifer and his collaborators, in 2007-2011 annual Chinese listed companies as data samples, the use of the term as an officer after a standard measure of promotion incentives, strict control of the factors affecting the financing of the regression model, multiple regression analysis, empirical study of the restrictive industrial policies for banks borrowing impact. Finally,it comes to the following conclusions:(1) restrictive industrial policies have not effectively curbed the growth rates of bank loans in specific industries.(2) in the restricted industries,long-term loans in state-owned enterprises were higher than the private enterprises.(3) there is a U-shaped relationship between tenure of office and the bank loans of local officials.