| The prisoner’s dilemma is the most important in the classical game theory and economics of a classical model,Literature at home and abroad and a lot of research has made abundant achievements, but the contradiction between individual rationality and group rationality is or has been plagued by many scholars both at home and abroad, in order to solve this dilemma, prompting the emergence of cooperative behavior and efficiency, a variety of different cooperation mechanism were successively put forward, such as the choice of reciprocity, space, group selection, kin selection, etc.. It plays an important role in promoting the transformation of non-cooperation to the cooperative behavior.Participants in the mechanism of heterogeneity and commitment as to promote the realization of the cooperative behavior is becoming more and more attention, But its introduction to the prisoner’s dilemma model has rarely been done to investigate such analysis. Based on this, this paper uses relevant theoretical knowledge of evolutionary game theory, through the commitment and heterogeneity introduced into the prisoner’s dilemma game model, and the establishment of cooperation related to the prisoner’s dilemma game model to analyze the impact on the result of cooperative behavior. The main research work is as follows:(1)The establishment of a prisoner’s dilemma game model of the evolution of cooperation based on the conditions under commitment, the influence of commitment to cooperative behavior caused by the decision variables, the results show that: when the management fee under certain conditions(management fees paid far less than the punishment), punishment is large enough, the participants will fulfill their commitments, the possibility of relatively large selection of cooperation, can greatly improve the success rate of cooperation. Model to explain the low success rate of cooperative behavior, as well as longing for cooperation agents, especially under the condition of asymmetric information of the agent provides the useful enlightenment.(2)Using evolutionary game theory, to participate in the main body under the condition of heterogeneity of the prisoner’s dilemma model are discussed in this paper, and the satisfaction under the condition of different evolutionary stable strategy, and the heterogeneity of individuals in populations of evolutionary stable strategy is analyzed, the influence of it is concluded that the populations of the same strategy choose individual heterogeneity, the greater the difference in individual choice cooperative behavior is, as the greater the likelihood of evolutionary stable strategy will be. Extremely, when individual heterogeneity tends to infinity, the evolution of cooperation is the only stable dominant strategy, and it provides a reasonable explanation for most of the reality t maintaining of the long-term cooperation system of a state of stable cooperation. |
