Study On The Mechanism Of Co-Petition Game Among Enterprises In Industrial Cluesters

Industrial cluster make a great contribution to regional economy’s prosperity, developing a grown industrial cluster has become a significant economic measure to local governments, even the whole country. And the key to increase the whole cluster’s benefits is whether the co-petition mechanism can be formed orderly. Therefor, classic game theory and model was used and innovated in this paper to seek the process and the balance point between the co-petition among enterprises, and finally to find out the available strategy for keeping efficient co-petition.On the one hand, the fair and reasonable interest distribution mechanism, is the key factor to keep long-term stable co-petition among enterprises in industrial clusters, on the other hand, co-petition in industry cluster mainly exists between homogeneous and heterogeneous enterprises. Therefor the main contents of this paper include:(1) constructing N-Cournot game model homo among homogeneous enterprises and find out the equilibrium solution;(2) constructing "prisoner’s dilemma" game model among homogeneous enterprises based on knowledge innovation and find out the equilibrium solution;(3) constructing two-stackelberg game model among heterogeneous enterprises (industrial chain) and find out the equilibrium solution.Through analyzing the mechanism of the N-Cournot model among homogeneity enterprises, the research find out that cooperation can achieve higher benefits than competition, but the enterprises can award short term betrayal benefits through unilateral betrayal, the cooperation benefits should be increased if the enterprises want to keep long-term co-petition stably.Through analyzing the mechanism of the prisoner dilemma model among homogeneity enterprises, the research find out that innovation cooperation can enhance the innovation and effects, but under the condition of incomplete information, some enterprises may choose to imitate others innovation rather than joint innovation, led to the loss of the enterprises who choose to cooperation, so the number of the imitation of enterprises and the degree of knowledge spillovers must be reduced.Through analyzing the mechanism of the two-stackelberg model among heterogeneous enterprise (industrial chain), the research find out that the manufacturer, as the core enterprise of the industry chain, if they sacrificed their interests temporarily to fulfill the collective interests, the whole industry chain efficiency can be maximized, but it won’t keep for a long time, unless the choice of competitive vendors can provide a certain amount of compensation for the producers, the compensation must be greater than the producers choose competition gains.Finally, in this paper, three examples were used to verify the three models.the Wenzhou lighter, Wenzhou Liushi low-voltage electrical and Shanghai car industrial clusters, to show how to realize the orderly co-petition among enterprises, and put forward specific measures, in order to achieve the purpose of practice theory.