The Research On Coordination Strategy Of Cloud Computing Service Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information

In recent years, the cloud computing service industry has developed rapidly, and then the cloud computer service supply chain has gradually formed which is composed of Application Service Provider (AIP), Application Platform Provider (APP), Application Service Provider (ASP) and customer enterprise. However, in real trading environment, the asymmetric information and risk averse behavior of node service providers leads to a lower performance of the whole cloud computer service supply chain. In this paper, the problem about how to design supply chain contract under asymmetric information to stimulate ASP to share the accurate demand information with the upstream members, make expected effort level and transfer the real exogenous conditions to upstream members are discussed. The main researches are as follows:(1)We discuss about how to coordinating the cloud computing service supply chain under asymmetric demand information with supply chain contract. In this part, we assuming that ASP could predict the accurate demand information while AIP and APP can’t. We examine the supply chain’s performance through discussing three situations:decentralized control model, centralized control model and quantity discount contract model (with the principle of incentive compatibility) which is based on the decentralized control model. We find that using quantity discount contract on the basis of decentralized control model can’t achieve perfect coordination, but it can attain Pareto improvement of the supply chain and each of its members. Moreover, the ASP doesn’t have motivation to transfer false demand information.(2)We focus on the coordination mechanism of cloud computing service supply chain under asymmetric effort level with discount contact through discussing three situations. Considering that in a supply chain the effort level of the downstream service provider largely determines the market demands, while the upstream service providers can’t master the down stream’s accurate information of effort level. In this part, we assume that the effort level of ASP is private information. The upstream members take lead in proving discount contract to stimulate ASP to pay expected effort level. It is important to emphasize that we apply two-way game rules, incentive compatibility principle and non-revisable order of ASP to the contract mechanism. As a result, ASP would pay the expected effort level and the supply chain could achieve Pareto improvement with this contract mechanism.(3)We research how to coordinate the supply chain under moral hazard with differential quantity discount mechanism through discussing three situations. In this part, we consider the logical relationship between the participation behavior of upstream node and the effort level of downstream node. We assume that the exogenous conditions such as network condition, economic condition, natural factors and so on, are not controlled by AIP, APP and ASP, as well as AIP and APP can’t observe ASP’s effort behavior. In order to balance the risk caused by exogenous conditions when it is distorted, supply chain contract mechanism should be designed in different form. It is shown that the differentiated contract mechanism based on the previous research could balance risk between supply chain members, improve the supply chain performance and attain Pareto improvement.