Institutional Investors,Accounting Conservatism,and Inefficient Investment

Investment is one of the "troikas" that drive economic growth.Efficient investment is the main driving force for long-term development of the company and an important source of stable future cash flow,but investment is often not guaranteed to be the most effective.Affected by many factors,investment activities will be distorted to varying degrees,resulting in excessive investment or insufficient investment,which seriously hinders the long-term development of enterprises.Previous studies have shown that information asymmetry and principal-agent problems are the main factors affecting investment efficiency.As an effective mechanism to resolve agent conflicts,accounting conservatism can effectively reduce information asymmetry and ease agency conflicts,thus becoming the focus of academic circles.So can accounting conservatism inhibit non-efficiency investment?As the most important force in the capital market,the corporate governance effectiveness of institutional investors has been supported by most research.In general,institutional investors can play an active supervisory role in corporate governance and improve corporate governance.However,there are also many studies showing that the supervision effect of different types of institutional investors is different.Compared with transactional institutional investors,stable institutional investors pay more attention to the potential value and long-term development of the target company,and therefore are more willing to participate in corporate governance,and are more willing to supervise the behavior of corporate management.So how do institutional investors,especially heterogeneous institutional investors,affect the relationship between accounting conservatism and inefficient investment?In addition,in the unique political background of China,are the roles of institutional investors different in enterprises with different property rights?Based on the above problems,the Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2017 were discussed as samples.The study found that accounting conservatism has a significant inhibitory effect on non-efficiency investment of enterprises;and institutional investors' shareholding enhances the suppression of accounting conservatism on non-efficiency investment.Further research shows that compared with transactional institutional investors,stable institutional investors have enhanced the suppression of accounting conservatism on corporate inefficient investment;compared with state-owned enterprises,accounting conservatism in non-state-owned enterprises The inhibition is more pronounced.Compared with Western countries,the inefficient investment behavior of Chinese listed companies is more common.Because China's economic system is not as perfect as that of Western developed countries,the governance mechanism of listed companies also has different degrees of defects,which can not play a good role in monitoring and controlling investment decisions.Therefore,in order to find ways to deal with non-efficiency investment behaviors,domestic scholars have carried out rich research and intense discussion.Based on the previous studies,this paper further enriches the related research on the influencing factors of non-efficiency investment,and expands the relevant literature on accounting conservatism,which has important guiding and practical significance.