Research On The Relationship Between Interest Groups Impact Property Rights Institutional Change Of State-Owned Enterprise

Interest groups are indispensable factors of system vicissitude, we can not ignore that the interest groups produce the effect on the direction of institutional change and the development of a country’s economic. Property rights system is an important part of modern enterprise system, in order to establish a modern enterprise system; China’s state-owned enterprises continuously make efforts on the property rights reform. Property rights reform of state-owned enterprises has experienced a long period, even though it has obtained the remarkable result, but a lot of problems haven’t been resolved during the reform. Based on state-owned enterprise property rights system vicissitude, to explore the behavior of interest groups in property rights system change, is useful to dig out the internal mechanism of state-owned enterprise property rights system vicissitude and the root cause, and prompt the deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprise property rights and making substantive progress.Based on a new angle of interest group to explain China’s state-owned enterprise property rights system vicissitude process, this paper emphatically is discussed how the relationship between each interest group affect the state-owned enterprise property rights system vicissitude. Firstly, this paper is expounded the theory of property rights, interest group theory and institutional change theory, which to lay a solid theoretical foundation for later analysis. Secondly, it is made a brief review for China’s state-owned enterprise property rights system vicissitude course, according to the above analysis, the main interest groups in the state-owned enterprise property rights system vicissitude, are divided into the government departments, state-owned enterprises operators and employees of state-owned companies and outside investors, and summarized their characteristic. Thirdly, in order to make empirical analysis on the relationship between interest groups in state-owned enterprise property right system change, the paper is built dual competition game model, the expected utility function model and control model, interpreting the function of the interest groups’behavior in making choice of property rights system. Finally, this paper is made a conclusion that the relationship between interest groups profoundly affects the reform process of state-owned enterprises, in the future reform we need to pay attention to the interest groups, coordinate the interests of all parties, and reduce resistance property rights reform of state-owned enterprises.