| Since China’s reforming and opening up, enterprise salary system in our country has been reformed gradually, which plays an important role in promoting enterprise reform and development. However, at the same time, there also exist some problems, such as unreasonable salary structure, imperfect salary regulation system. The separation of enterprise ownership and management right, make the interests of enterprise owners is opposed to the manager’s. Because of the inconsistent interests of shareholder and manager, the asymmetrical information and the difficult supervision of shareholder, the behavior contract of shareholder and manager is inconformity. If let the output as an index to measure the effort level of senior executive, then what is more reasonable is to make connection between the executive compensation and corporate performance and use it to measure the compensation contract of senior executive. So, research on the executive compensation-performance sensitivity has important theoretical and practical significance.Based on the summary of empirical literature and the theoretical analysis framework that contains the principal-agent theory, the management incentive theory and the optimal compensation contract theory, this paper choose some sample data to conduct an influence study of corporate performance from the normative analysis and empirical analysis. These sample data are 2580 a-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2013, including 1760 state-owned enterprises and 820 non-state-owned enterprises. Then, according to the actual holding people, the listed companies in China can be divided into state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies. By using the cross-section data, this paper conducts the principal component analysis and the regression analysis to extract the main factors that affects the corporate performance, such as corporate governance structure and corporate characteristics. Then it conducts an empirical analysis that influencing factors impact on the corporate executive compensation-performance sensitivity. Due to the influencing factors of executive compensation structure is varied, this paper from the field of corporate finance focuses on the influence that six aspects impact on the corporate executive compensation performance sensitivity, they are the ownership concentration, the board independence, the board size, the executives duality, the executive tenure and the company size. Through the descriptive analysis, correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis and robustness testing, this paper finds that (1) the improvement of the proportion of the equity concentration, the independent director and the board size, can effectively improve the corporate executive compensation-performance sensitivity. (2) The merge of chairman’s two positions has no effect on the compensation-performance sensitivity. (3) The bigger the company size, the lower the executive compensation-performance sensitivity.By comparing the corresponding data of non-state-owned listed companies and the state-owned listed companies, this paper finds that the level of executive compensation and the enterprise scale of the state-owned listed companies are much higher than the non-state-owned listed companies. However the mean comprehensive performance level of former is lower than the latter and the performance difference of former is lower than the latter as well. In China’s state-owned enterprises, state-owned shares take a larger proportion. On the contrary, executive shareholding quantity is lower than non-state-owned enterprises. Every factor has different effect on the compensation-performance sensitivity of the state-owned enterprises and the compensation-performance sensitivity of the non-state-owned enterprises. Compared with the governance structure of the state-owned enterprises, the governance structure of the non-state-owned enterprises has much higher influence on the compensation-performance sensitivity. Benefited from the continuous reform of the state-owned enterprise executive compensation system, the compensation performance sensitivity of the state-owned enterprises is much higher than the non-state-owned enterprises. The influence that the merge of chairman’s two positions, the proportion of independent directors and the company scale impact on the state-owned enterprises is much higher than the influence that impact on the non-state-owned enterprises. At last, according to the empirical conclusion, this paper proposes some concrete measures and policy recommendations, that is, perfect the executive compensation system and compensation structure of listed companies in our country, which contains the state-owned listed companies and the non-state-owned listed companies. |
