Research On The Impact Of Non-state Shareholders' Participation In Governance On The Performance Sensitivity Of Executive Compensation In State-owned Enterprise

State-owned enterprises undertake the important task of guiding China’s healthy economic development through reform.Under the background of the overall reform of state-owned enterprises,the compensation of senior executives in state-owned enterprises has been widely concerned by academia and society.The participation of non-state-owned shareholders in governance is an important approach to the mixed ownership reform.The state tries to encourage non-state-owned capital to actively participate in the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,give full play to its capital advantages to help improve the governance structure of state-owned enterprises,promote the incentive and restraint mechanism in place,improve the governance quality of state-owned enterprises,and supervise the establishment of a reasonable and effective incentive mechanism for executive compensation.Therefore,in the context of mixed ownership reform,in order to improve the ability of corporate governance,this paper uses the research method combining regression analysis and case analysis to study the influence of non-state-owned shareholders’ participation in governance on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance of state-owned enterprises from two dimensions of equity participation and high-level governance.Based on combing relevant research literature at home and abroad and theoretically analyzing the influence of non-state-owned shareholders’ participation in governance on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance of state-owned enterprises,this paper selects state-owned manufacturing enterprises with mixed ownership reform of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2015 to 2019 to test the influence of non-state-owned shareholders’ participation in governance on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance of state-owned enterprises.The results show that the participation of non-state-owned shareholders in governance is helpful to improve the performance sensitivity of executive compensation of state-owned enterprises.Based on the above discussion of general rules,this study chooses Yueyang Forest Paper Co.,LTD.as the research object for case analysis.By exploring the process of non-state-owned shareholders’ participation in governance under the background of mixed ownership reform of the company,the change of its executive compensation with the change of performance is observed.This paper analyzes the internal mechanism of the influence of non-state-owned shareholders’ participation in governance on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance of state-owned enterprises.The results show that through non-state-owned shareholders holding shares and appointing directors,Yueyang Linpaper can penetrate into the internal governance structure of the enterprise so as to check and balance the rights of state-owned controlling shareholders and senior executives,directly and effectively supervise the behavior of the management,promote contractual management and improve the governance ability of the enterprise.At the same time,market-oriented compensation incentive mechanism should be promoted to ensure that executive compensation is reasonably linked to corporate performance and improve the sensitivity of executive compensation performance.The regression analysis is consistent with the conclusion of case analysis.Finally,under the background of mixed ownership reform,this study proposes that state-owned enterprises give full play to the governance role of non-state-owned shareholders and improve the sensitivity of executive compensation performance of state-owned enterprises,so as to promote the governance ability of state-owned enterprises and realize the optimization of non-state-owned shareholders’ participation in governance.