Research On Auction Based Spectrum Allocation Mechanism For Dynamic Spectrum Access

With the emerging of more and more wireless services, the traditional fixed spec-trum allocation cannot meet the increasing demand of spectrum resources. Dynamic Spectrum Allocation is considered to be the key technology allowing people to use the spectrum holes efficiently. Auction, which can achieve dynamic spectrum allocation, has attracted much attentions, as it can efficiently incentive primary users to share their spectrums. Recent studies on such auction design mostly focus on greedily maximiz-ing social welfare or revenue, and assume Secondary Users (SUs) can full utilize the spectrum. However, such kind of auctions always cause low real spectrum utilization,if SUs get spectrum more than they really need(e.g. some secondary users prefer to mo-nopolize the secondary spectrum access right with high bids which is inconsistent with their true spectrum requirements, or the bandwidth provided by the spectrum is lager than SU’s requirement).To address this problem, through integrating real spectrum utilization, we present a novel real spectrum utilization based auction design. We provide a framework for auctioneer to leverage the tradeoff between real spectrum utilization and social wel-fare/revenue. Then, through integrating bandwidth requirement for SUs, we present group based auction design. The main contributions of the thesis is as follows.(l)For situations in which secondary users prefer to monopolize the secondary spectrum access right with high bids, through integrating real spectrum utilization, we present a new truthful spectrum auction mechanism which combines real spectrum utilization and bid to improve real spectrum utilization. For single channel auction, we adopt greedy algorithm to get a near optimal solution with a much lower time complexity; when pricing, we use "critical virtual bid" method to get a much lower complexity. For multi-channel auction, through dividing the plane into hexagon, we transfer the problem into Knapsack problem and lowers the computing complexity. We prove our mechanisms are both truthful theoretically. Simulation results show that our mechanism can significantly improve the real spectrum utilization.(2)For situations in which SUs cannot full utilize its bandwidth,through integrat-ing SUs’ bandwidth requirement, we propose group based auction to improve the uti-lization of spectrum and satisfy more SUs. We divide the plane into hexagons to get a near optimal solution while lower the time complexity. Then, we extend the mechanis-m to a truthful auction and prove its truthfulness. The experiment result shows that our mechanism can can significantly improve spectrum utilization and satisfy more users.