Study On Development Of China’s TV Media Industry

The starting point of this paper, on the one hand from the perspective ofmedia economics to grasp its general industrial properties, as well as withsignificantly different specific attributes from other industries. Concluded on thebasis of previous research results, this paper presents the concept "doubleproperties","composite benefits " and "triple markets" of the TV mediaindustry.On the other hand from the perspective of regulatory economicsanalysis that government regulation should be taken into an expansionanalytical framework of R-SCP as a vital factor and applyling the framework toanalyze China’s TV media industry in order to explore some problems amongit.Then learning from foreign experience and proposing ideas on regulationreconstruction.TV media industry R-SCP analytical framework is the cornerstone of theentire study. Studies suggest that during the era of strict regulation on theindustry, the market structure as a exogenous variable and governmentregulation directly on market behavior in order to improve business efficiencyand social welfare, so regulation plays a leading role and "SCP" paradigm ofno practical significance; during the last two decades of industry deregulation,the market structure has become as a endogenous variable and the mutualconduction of"SCP"has gradually emerged, but in view of the specialproperties of the industry, the government is still to shape the marketstructure,which deems reasonable and effective competition through itsregulation. Meanwhile, based on the enterprise market and industryperformance,the government will take appropriate regulatory measures toaffect the market structure and re-shaping. Each factors of R-S-C-P mutualfeedback and influence, then ultimately will fullfill the development of a virtuouscircle of the industry.Therefore regulation remains a primary variable whichaffect the industrial organization.On empirical study of China’s TV media industry, the government haseased the regulatory system to a certain extent, which create a televisionbroadcasting, advertising and programm market. However, because of directinterference with the regional administrative monopoly of government and thelack of exit mechanism,"Matthew Effect" significantly appears on thebroadcasting and the advertising market,whereas,about the programm,thestate-owned television programs dominated the market and social productionorganizations still weak.The Changes of market structure bring competitioninto markert, which induce enterprises take pricing, organizational structure and product behavior. But government still favors on regulation ofadministrative intervention, regardless of the laws of the market and industrialproperties, so that a diversified behavior traps in " Marshall paradox "dilemma,and regulation lags behind acts in terms of pricing, financing product quality,etc. In short, regulatory laws and regulations are unclear and infeasible.Subjected to conduction effects of market structure and market behavior,market performance has improved significantly, particularly in the aspects ofsocial performance. However, state-owned TV stations, which take mainportion of the whole industry are still under the administrative monopoly. Theylack of drive to improve their economic performance, result in single source ofincome, low rate of program production and broadcast ratios, resourceutilization ratios and input-output ratios, leading to the decline of actual profits.Whereas,the performance of social production organizations,which are underderegulation are optimistic.Study concluded that these problems root in theunperfect regulatory system.In this paper,having learned from the United States and British TV mediaindustry experience, the author finds the development of their TV mediaindustry is closely related to the integrity of its legal system and anindependent regulatory body, furthemore, deregulation and regulationreconstruction at the same time. Thus, studies propose the ideas of regulationreconstruction of China’s TV media industry and establishment of a "hard andsoft constraints" regulatory system, and specifically set a two-stagereconstruction of regulatory goals.