The Research Of Optimal Insurance Model Under The Moral Hazard

As China has joined the WTO and connected with the insurance market abroad, serious asynlrnetric information takes place between our insurer and insured. This paper studies solutions to these moral hazard problems by the mathematics method in our insurance market from the angle of information microeconomics. First of all, the paper gives an introduction concerning information microeconomics, approaches the cause of the moral hazard and the severity of the aftermath in theory, and fully explains the significance and urgency in solving the asymmetrical problem in information in Chinese insurance industry. Then gives the countermeasure model to solve contract relationship in the asynlrnetric information: the principal-agent model. Then from the angle of the information symmetry, by adopting "the parameterized distribution formulation"and establishing the mathematical model and conclude that the optimal insurance contract can achieve optimal risk-sharing raised by Pareto. On the basis of this, I emphasize on the analysis of information asymmetry, partly construct the different models according to the different risk style of agent's action and accidents. These models constitute theoretical foundation of countermeasures and suggestions according to the asymmetrical problem in information in Chinese insurance industry. In order to promote the research of the mechanism of moral hazards and the effective precautions and dominations of moral hazard in insurance field, I adopt the game theory, construct the game modle under moral hazard and add the fine into the model, at this moment the Nash-equilibrium point relates to fine, check toll and precaution measure toll, and proves that it is rational and feasible for the insurance company to encourage the insurer by adopting fines to avoid moral hazard.