The Research Of The Influence Of The Equity Structure Of Listing Companies In China On Affiliate Transitions

China’s listed company is not developed from classical enterprise but growing up withthe negation and reform of the planned economy enterprise system. As a result, thecompanies has a distinctive features of highly concentrated and lacking of constraints. Also,Most of the china’s listed company is transformed from state-owned enterprise, leading toa countless ties between the listed company and its parent and subsidiaries, which makesthe related transaction of the company frequently and enormously. Under this equitystructure, the controlling shareholder handling the profits of the company in order to occupythe interests of minority shareholders. These activities give a bad influence on the companyperformance and longtime growth. The deep reform of china’s stocking market and theenterprise system gives the listed company a great development, scholars at home andabroad have done a deep research on the interest conflicts caused by the related transitionfrom the theory and the practice.At first, the paper describes the project background, reviewing the research of thescholar at home and abroad about the shareholding structure and related transition,concluding and analyzing the related concepts and theoretical basis. Secondly, the paperput forward a theoretical basis on the basis of previous research and related analysis.Thirdly, this paper examines the influence of ownership concentration, equity balancedegree, controlling stockholder, reform of the shareholder structure of listed company onthe related transition as far as the deep influence of the related transition on the companyperformance. By using the method of multiple regression analysis of SPSS17.0on the dataof A-share listing company of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from2011to2012,thispaper’s empirically results find that: the ownership concentration have positive effect onrelated transaction significantly, the relation between the check-and-balance ownershipstructure and related transaction is significantly negative. The related transaction hasnegative effect on the company performance significantly when we use the ROA and TQas the proxies of performance, and related transaction do not stimulate the companyperformance. The result shows the reform of ownership structure is the core of corporate governance. The tunneling through connected transaction by controlling shareholder inlisted companyy should be restricted and more promotion of supervising to corporategovernance is inevitable. This paper put forward a rationalized proposal to theimprovement of the regulation of the governance structure of China listed company,company performance, protection of small&middle shareholders’ rights, andimprovement of promoting China’s sustained and healthy development of the securitiesmarket by the research.