Researches On The Relations Of Related Party Transactions And Shareholding Structure In Listed Companies

As we all know, there are two kinds of effects in the related party transactions. On the one hand, the intra-group transactions can save internal transaction costs and improve the efficiency of the transaction, which effectively enhance the value of listed companies; On the other hand, the related parties plunder the listed companies in the transactions driven by the interests. And the latter has been used wider. The related party transactions are swamped among China's listed companies, and the problems arising from the transactions also become more serious. "Emptied"& "tunneling" are not new vocabularies. There are numbers of researches in variety aspects tried to find the right way to guide the transactions, which were made by domestic and foreign scholars.This paper wrote from the perspective of the shareholder structure, based on background of the ongoing reform of the sub-owned shares, the previous research, as well as the data of listed companies from 2002 to 2006. Through analyzing the related parties' transactions deeply in theoretical and empirical perspective, this paper tries to find out the relation between the current shareholding structure of China's listed companies and the related parties' transactions, as well as whether the sub-owned shares reform has impact on the shareholder structure of listed companies and the related party transactions.Much conclusion of research found that: The related parties' transactions in China's Listed Companies no matter the frequency or amount the transactions involved increased year by year; the identity of the controlling shareholder is still the state-owned shares on behalf of the state shares, which is main party in tunneling of the listed companies; irrational and high concentration of shareholder structure are important reason of related parties' transactions, and the multi-shareholder situation has yet to take shape. Commodity purchase, secured mortgage and leasing transactions modes are still the main forms of the related parties' transaction, which should be attention is huge amount transaction in the mode of secured mortgage increase the listed companies' operating risks, and it's a way of hidden assets plundering. Under the background of sub-owned shares reform, the listed companies concentration of shareholder structure remains high, continued to be the main reason for the transaction.These conclusions above imply that in order to regulate China's listed companies related parties' transactions should be from both internal and external started. (I) In order to improve their internal corporate governance structure should optimize the shareholding structure, and change "only one controlling shareholder" to "multi-shareholders controlling" gradually. Take full advantage of the power of institutional investors; accumulate the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders and then several controlling shareholders combined to restrict the "tunneling". (2) In order to improve the internal corporate governance structure should establish good internal supervision and incentive mechanisms, the manager not only need to be given effective supervision, but also need good incentive to make their functions more effectively; (3) In the perfect external market environment, there should be perfect external capital markets, to make transactions more transparent, and the capital more effectively; (4) In the perfect external market environment, there should be corresponding legal system; state-owned enterprises should be implemented equal status treatment in order to protect the rights and interests of small shareholders.