The Empirical Research On The Influence Of Ownership Structure To Related Party Transaction And Corporate Performance

This article empirically investigates the effect of corporate ownership structure on related party transactions, and related party transactions on corporate performance based in the post non-tradable share reform era as theory background, by using data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Markets during 2008-2009. As it is known for us, Chinese listed companies are derived from rebuilding of state-own firms. This results the ownership in Chinese listed companies is higher centralized than in western countries. Many researches find that such special ownership structure is not benefit to minority shareholders and controlling shareholders are in favor of related party transactions to manage profits or transfer benefits. The study uses panel data based regression approach. This paper's empirically results find that (1) the concentration of shareholding ratio, the controlling shareholder have positive effect on related party transaction significantly, the check-and-balance ownership structure and related party transaction is significantly negative correlativity. (2) if the biggest shareholder of listed companies belongs to a group, the amount of related party transaction will be greater and have more probability of connected transaction. (3) the institutional investors'shareholding ratio has negative effect on related party transaction significantly, while the institutional investors'quantity in Top10 shareholders and related party transaction has significantly positive correlativity. (4) the related party transaction has negative effect on corporate performance significantly when we use the ROA and TQ as the proxies of performance, and related party transactions do not stimulate the increase of firm's performance. The result shows the reform of ownership structure is the core of corporate governance. The tunneling through connected transaction by controlling shareholder in listed companies should be restricted and more promotion of supervising to corporate governance is inevitable.