The Study Of Premium Evasion Problem Of Basic Endowment Insurance System

The collection of old-age insurance fund in full and on time is a precondition for the pension insurance financial sustainable development, however, our pension insurance arrears evasion problem is more prominent, which threatens the healthy development of the pension insurance system. This paper analyzes the cause and manner of endowment insurance arrears evasion, estimates that the scale of pension insurance arrears evasion, and empirical analysis of the impact of the pension insurance arrears to escape the impact of the fee scale factors.The first part of this paper introduces the research background and significance of the research purpose, ideas, methods, and the description and analysis of relevant research results at home and abroad.The second part describes the course of development of the old-age insurance for urban workers in China probably, as can be seen from the development process, party to burden the pension insurance cost is also changing with the reform of system, which becomes current businesses, workers and national tripartite burden from the beginning of the burden on enterprises, social pooling, enterprises non-operating expenses paid, a corporate insurance system to the enterprise and the national burden. It introduces the current financing mode of our country town worker endowment insurance is " Combination of Social Pooling and Individual Account", collection cardinality uses salary as a reference, the contribution rate of the respective businesses and individuals, coverage and the issuance of endowment insurance fund. It describes that endowment insurance fund comes from companies, individuals and countries, but implements in a way of the "corporate contribution, supplemented by workers payment, and combination with financial support". The ways of evasion are selective insured, false declaration of endowment insurance base, deliberately untrue declaration or reject payment and not standardized business employment. Using the average salary for the provinces to measure the statutory pension insurance fund income, the ratio of actual pension income and statutory pension insurance fund income is used as the actual rate, using the actual rate to measure scales of escaping our country town worker endowment insurance fee, significant differences are found by calculating provincial rates.The third part of this paper analyzes the reasons of urban workers basic old-age insurance arrears evasion from the qualitative and quantitative, the reasons of enterprise arrears evasion are too high contribution rate, overwhelmed enterprises, companies recognize the error and refuse payment for its own sake etc. Government doesn’t governance arrears evasion reasonably due to limited capacity and; local government lack governance arrears evasion incentives due to reasons of fiscal decentralization and government assessment mechanism. The workers arrears escape fee because they have personal financial difficulties and can not afford to pay the cost of the pension insurance, they don’t trust the old-age insurance system, don’t want to participate in the pension insurance; and don’t realize the future of the pension risk due to personal short-sighted; corporate violates the rights and interests of workers pension insurance, but workers are forced to arrears flee because of fear of retaliation and weak legal consciousness fee. Implicit debt problems emerges in the transition process of old-age insurance system, enterprises and workers pursue their maximal interests and select the delinquent evasion due to irrational distribution of the debt burden. Due to the system of mandatory contribution base and the contribution years, the population of low-income groups and informal employment is difficult to meet the provisions of pension insurance payment years and base payment; the old-age insurance premium paid by the implementation of enterprise self-declaration of total wages, social insurance institutions perform the audit, but it results in the audit total wages less than the actual total wages due to a more complex form of wages and imperfect social security information system.We chose the town worker basic old-age insurance coverage as indicators of flight fee, select the basic old-age insurance premium paid by urban workers rate evasion as arrears indicators, select six factors to explain the collection rate of change, which are level of economic development, labor market environment, the support of the government on social security, pension burden, ownership structure and collecting agencies. Quantitative indicators are per capita GDP, the number of labor disputes, social security and employment spending accounts for financial expenditure, the elderly dependency ratio and the number of employees of state-owned and state-holding enterprises accounted for the proportion of the total number of employees.After analysis we found increasing the support of government for Social Security can not significantly improve the coverage of old-age insurance and collection rate. The increase in GDP can significantly improve the collection rate and coverage.Quantitative indicators of labor market environment are the number of labor disputes, in general, the worse the more areas of non-formal employment and low-income workers, the labor market environment, the greater the number of labor disputes. First of labor market environment’s influence on the coverage and collection rate, we should look at the labor market environment and workers in the labor market vulnerable to resistance caused by the basic old-age insurance for urban workers, which will have a negative impact for workers to enter the collection rate and the coverage of the pension insurance. Secondly, with the development of economy into the town to work, informal employment, migrant workers that the original did not enter the town worker basic endowment insurance enter the town worker endowment insurance system, these new forces join is helpful to improve the endowment insurance fund income. The analysis found a positive correlation between the collection rate and coverage, a regional non-formal employment and low-income workers more, the greater the potential for the development of old-age insurance.Population aging and pension insurance fund the gap pressure makes government to increase arrears evasion governance, however, due to the government assessment mechanism is not consistent with the development of old-age insurance, the government may also connived enterprises and workers fled fee arrears. In order to guard against pension risk, workers are also actively participate in the payment, may also be worried about the pension insurance fund gap exists. So pension burden of aggravating the impact on the rate and the coverage is more complex, through the analysis I found it didn’t pass the significance test.The paper does some analysis on discussion about the collecting agencies of choice and tax reform in academia and reality, whether the tax authorities or the social insurance institutions collection of old-age insurance, have their own advantages. The collection of the tax authorities experienced, sound information, professional endowments. Meanwhile, using the form of Social Security tax can be more mandatory and binding national co-ordination, solve the transfer and continuation of the pension insurance, enterprise, personal and national finances tripartite Pareto improvement; social insurance institutions directly contact with the insured population, understand the details of the pension insurance practice, and the collection can reduce transaction costs. However, non-uniform collecting agencies increases the difficulty on coordination of old-age insurance premium paid, restricts the effect of the pension insurance premiums, which is unfavorable for governance for pension insurance arrears evasion. This article introduce collecting agencies as dummy variables.The last part of this article made some suggestions, the first is to improve the pension insurance system, a good system will attract more people free in the pension insurance system actively involved. China’s pension insurance contribution rate is relatively high, for people in informal employment and operational difficulties of enterprises and workers, adjusting the payment rate and years can reduce the resistance that they participate in the urban workers old-age insurance. At the same time, we can set the indicators such as years of contribution base and the coefficient of base pay and so on, rational design of the issuance of the pension fund pension insurance balance between efficiency and fairness. In addition, you can set endowment insurance costs of collection and inspection efforts reasonably, set different pension insurance fee collection efforts for different types of businesses. We should establish an old-age insurance costs payment integrity evaluation system, for the enterprise that payment integrity coefficient is relatively low, the collecting agencies should increase scrutiny, optimize the collection system. In addition, improvement of the labor market and protection of workers’ pension insurance interests should be done. Judging from the international experience, the magnitude of financial support from China’s old-age insurance is still relatively small, we should increase fiscal spending, improve the function of transfer payments, and increase the collection rate of the pension insurance.