Closed-loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Study Of Incentives Mechanism Based On Third-party Recovery

With the awareness of environmental protection awareness and shortage of resources, the whole society is also more and more concerned on the problem of the recycling of waste products. In recent years, many countries have enacted laws to force manufacturers to recycle the waste products. In2009, China is also published the Ordinance on the recycling of waste electrical and electronic products, and started implementation in2011. According to the development situation of our country, recycled products is imperative. Manufacturers using waste products will bring benefits itself. Then, the manufacturer to motivate recycling centers to recycling waste products, which can promote the use of recycled waste products. Remanufacturing will save social resources, protect the environment, at the same time, enhance the corporate image and so on, has an important significance.Considering the little existing literature on this measure, so this paper aims to explore closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium model of incentive mechanism. The primary contents of this thesis are:the manufacturer incentives recycling center to come on recycling activities, with this measure of profit maximization model of each node and variational inequality conditions, Finally got the equilibrium price of the whole closed-loop supply chain, and provides the algorithm. The specific contents are as follows:The mainly research is the network equilibrium model with multiple manufacturers, multiple retailers, a plurality of market demand and a plurality of third party recovery center.First, it discusses the research of the domestic and foreign scholars research on closed-loop supply chain and innovation and shortcomings of this article.Secondly, starting from the manufacturer’s point of view, discuss the manufacturer in order to encourage the recycling center, set a minimum amount for recycling center. If recycling center sales is more than the lowest recovery, manufacturers will give to the reward to exceed number of this part. On the basis of the new products and remanufactured products is assumed conditions of no difference in terms of sale price, through the application of variational inequality theory on each node enterprises, analyze each participating subjects to achieve profit maximization should meet inequality conditions optimal selection problem. This paper focaus on this manufacturer direct incentive mechanism to the recycling center, each node enterprise profit maximization model and constraints, the equilibrium solution of each node enterprise.Finally, the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium solution be proved, and provides the algorithm of model. Prospect the future research direction.