Principal-agency, Interest Deviation And Efficiency Improvement

State-owned enterprises are the pillar of the national economy, the development of thesocialist market economy and I play a decisive role in the economic system reform. State-ownedenterprises have all the hallmarks of modern enterprises, including the separation of ownershipand managerial authority, as well as the conflict of interest between the owner and the operator.Compared to state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, agency problems may be moreserious. Because our country state-owned enterprise principal-agent relationship has entrustedagent level, more essential characteristics of the subject is not clear, the principal-agent problemsof state-owned enterprises is very outstanding, how to eliminate or reduce the principal-agentproblems, protect the interests of investors, to become a worldwide problem. Because ourcountry state-owned enterprise principal-agent relationship has entrusted agent level, moreessential characteristics of the subject is not clear, the principal-agent problems of state-ownedenterprises is very outstanding, solve the principal-agent problems of state-owned enterprises tooptimize the state-owned enterprise principal-agent relations, improve the efficiency of ourcountry state-owned enterprise financial, to realize the value of state-owned assets has veryimportant theoretical significance and practical significance.This research uses the standard research and empirical research method of combining thefrom the perspective of principal-agent, the efficiency of the state-owned enterprise financialproblems. Article prime minister this topic research present situation, the research significance,research contents and research methods do in this research. Then the basic theory of financialefficiency problem of state-owned enterprises made a systematic carding, then to analyze fromthe perspective of principal-agent the generating mechanism of state-owned enterprise financialefficiency on the basis of the financial efficiency of state-owned enterprises to do thecorresponding empirical research, the last is presented based on the foregoing all the efficiencyof the state-owned enterprise financial systemic countermeasures and Suggestions forimprovement.Through the study of the main research conclusions are as follows:(1) the state-owned enterprise financial efficiency is low because of principal-agent chain islong and low efficiency of each layer of principal-agent, this is the main reason, but not a causeof the state-owned enterprise the root of the principal-agent exist many problems. Only a realstake in reform and financial governance efficiency is the key to promote efficiency of thestate-owned enterprise financial.(2) the only tangible improvement to the complex relationship of principal-agent chain ofstate-owned enterprises, commissioned by the dual identity of reduction, equity clarity, can reallysolve the state-owned enterprise financial efficiency is low.(3) to enhance the efficiency of each layer of principal-agent, the key is to improve themoral quality of agent, or design more good mechanism to control and motivate the agentbehavior, so that they cannot breach of contract, not to drill the vulnerability of incompletecontract.