Research On Pricing Strategy, Coordination Mechanism And Network Equilibrium Of Closed-loop Supply Chain Under Competitive Environment

Nowadays, with the problems of environmental pollution and resource shortages gettingmuch worse in the rapid development of the global economy, it has become a cosmopolitanissue that how to realize the coordinated development of the economy, society andenvironment. In the theoretical paradigm of the circular economy, closed-loop supply chaintakes the reverse collection of used products into the company’s strategic decision system andtherefore, forming a closed-loop circle with the chief characteristics of “material-production-consumption-renewable resources”. While in comparison with the traditionalsupply chain management, researching on the issues of the closed-loop supply chain is morecomplicated because of involving used products’ reverse collection process into theenterprises’ strategic management. On the other hand, the complicated interior structure andcooperation mechanism of the supply chain would exert a direct impact on the optimaldecisions of the supply players, it is particularly important to analyze impacts of co-opetitionmechanism of supply chain on the optimal behavior of the decision-makers, researching onremanufacturing closed-loop supply chain management under competitive environment hasgradually become the major concern in the current management community.From the perspective of supply chain competition, this paper uses optimization theory,game theory, coordination theory and equilibrium theory to explore the pricing strategies,coordination mechanism and network equilibrium of the remanufacturing closed-loop supplychain. And we further considers the impacts of customer’s willingness-to-pay,remanufacturing cost-savings, supply chain structures, chain member’s risk behavior andchannel power structures on the enterprises’ optimal decision. The major research works areas follows:1. The pricing and coordination model of a remanufacturing system consisting of onemanufacturer and one remanufacturer is put forward. Based on DFD (Design forDisassenbablity) theory and consumer preference theory, we establish a two-periodprofit-maximizing model in which the OEM determines its product disassemblability level inthe first period, and the remanufacturer then enters the market to compete with the OEM in the second period. The optimal prices and the optimal product disassemblability level for twocases that remanufacturing is unconstrained and remanufacturing is constrained are derived.In addition, we further characterize the effects of cost savings, parameters associated withproduct design, consumers’ preference to remanufactured products on the equilibriumdecisions and profits.2. The remanufacturing Closed-loop supply chain decision model with two competingmanufacturers and a single retailer is established based on game theory. The bestremanufacturing effort level, wholesale price, retailer price, channel member’s profits andtotal profits of the remanufacturing system in the centralized decision and decentralizeddecision cases are compared. To this end, a modified slotting allowances contract is proposedto coordinate the remanufacturing system.3. A dual-channel closed-loop supply chain model is established. Through establishescentralized decision model and decentralized decision model under three different channelpower structures, Manufacturer-Stackelberg channel, Retailer-Stackelberg channel andVertical Nash structure, the optimal solutions are derived respectively. Then, we compare theequilibrium prices, the channel member profit and the total profit of the system under thesedifferent decision models. Furthermore, we examine the coordination mechanism for adual-channel closed-loop supply chain and find a coordination mechanism with acomplementary two-part tariff agreement can coordinate the dual-channel closed-loop supplychain and be mutually beneficial for the manufacturer and the retailer.4. This section studies a closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium problem whichconsists of multiple competitive suppliers, multiple manufacturers, and multiple risk-averseretailers with multiple stochastic demand markets. Through the analysis of the networkstructure, the equilibrium conditions of various decision makers and the whole closed-loopsupply chain network are derived and the finite-dimensional variational inequalityformulation is established. Finally, based on the characteristics of the model, theQuasi-Newton method is built to solve the problem and the impacts of the stochasticremanufacturing rate, collection rate and the risk-averse coefficient of retailers on the optimaldecisions and network equilibrium are illustrated through numerical examples.