Farmers’ Ecological Construction Willingness And Behavior In Grain For Green

In1999, the experimental work of the grain for green project carried out in China’sSichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu provinces, by the end of2010, national forestation total area ofmore than147million hectares. The people had seen the achievements of returning farmlandto forest, but behind the dazzling results, the late returning farmland to forest sustainability ofecological construction had became increasingly prominent. How to develop effectiveecological compensation policies and motive farmers whose land had been reclaimed toembark on the road of sustainable development of ecological construction is particularlyimportant in the present. Farmers as the main body of ecological construction, the actualbehavior is directly to the success of the project of returning farmland to forest or not.Retrieve relevant literature will find that the existing research focused on the analysis ofinfluencing factors on farmers’ willingness or behavior, and mostly isolated study of farmers’willingness or behavior, and combined with the farmers’ willingness and behavior to study theecological compensation mechanism is still relatively rare. Therefore, combined with thefarmers inner psychological factors and other external policy factors, study of the ecologicalconstruction in the decision-making process of the farmers can not only enrich the results oftheoretical studies, and more critical for understanding the internal mechanism of farmlandarea farmers ecological construction and its compensation, and can also provide a scientificand valuable reference for the follow-up policy-making.In this study, there are five parts. First of all, analysis and collating relevant literature.Mainly from the domestic and foreign study about the wishes of farmers, farmers’ behavior,ecological compensation mechanism and other aspects, review of these documents, andcombined with the severe areas of information and case, finding the inadequacies of theexisting research and proposed in this paper to solve the academic issues. Secondly, determinethe theoretical model and research hypotheses of this study. On the basis of a detaileddiscussion of theory of planned behavior, combined with the actual situation of the famers,determined to build a model ideas and specific objectives and build the conceptual model, andinitially formed to be tested assumptions. Thirdly, the survey design and variable selection.Describe the design process of the questionnaire, the Ansai county173farmers’ field researchas the analysis samples, and analysis of the validity of the sample. Fourthly, the empirical research. The method of combining qualitative and quantitative analysis of feasibility studies,the use of structural equation model of farmers whose land had been reclaimed ecologicalconstruction willingness and behavior relationships, internal and external factors affect theirbehavior, and focused on the behavior of the present ecological compensation mechanism forfarmers’ ecological construction incentive effect. Finally, conclusions and recommendations.Concluded summarize and targeted policy recommendations based on the empirical results.The main conclusion of the study:Firstly, this study build structural equation model based on the theory of plannedbehavior to analyzed the farmers’ willingness and behavior was reasonable and applicable, thefarmers inner psychological factors behavior attitude, subjective norm and perceived behaviorcontrol had significant positive correlation toward farmers’ ecological constructionwillingness, the direct effects on ecological construction willingness were0.232,0.209and0.206, and had important indirect effect toward the behavior of farmers’ ecologicalconstruction, the indirect effects were0.135,0.122and0.120. Farmers’ ecologicalconstruction willingness had significant positive correction toward the behavior of farmers’ecological construction (total effect was0.582).Secondly, the external policy factors (the current ecological compensation policies) hadnot direct effect toward the behavior of farmers’ ecological construction (path coefficient β5=0.038，P=0.676), and had significant positive correlation toward farmers’ ecologicalconstruction willingness (direct effect was0.251), and it could through farmers’ willingnesshad indirect effect toward the behavior of farmers’ ecological construction.(indirect effectwas0.146). This shows that the current ecological compensation policy had positivecorrelation toward the behavior of farmers’ ecological construction, but also far from strongand effective incentive the farmers to participate in eco-construction, we can say that theexisting ecological compensation mechanism was not able to incentive farmers to participatein eco-construction.Thirdly, the farmers’ policy attitude, to achieve self-worth and their own economicrationality had made great contributions to their behavior attitude, it could directly lead to thegeneration of ecological construction willingness; government, family and neighbors’opinions had made great contributions to their subjective norms, when farmers makingdecisions they were affected by government, family and neighbors’ opinions a lot, and theiractivities could affect to the generation of ecological construction willingness; the farmers’production capacity perception, perception of risk ability and benefits perception had madegreat contributions to their perceived behavior control, and its could affect to the generation ofecological construction willingness; subsidies, information transparency, change the subsidy policy, government inspection and follow-up policy had made great contributions toecological compensation policy, and its could affect to the generation of ecologicalconstruction willingness; farmers’ ecological construction willingness had significant positivecorrection toward their behavior, it means that the stronger the farmers’ willingness, thehigher probability of the behavior of farmers’ ecological construction.Finally, summarized the conclusions of this study and proposed policy recommendationson this basis.