A Study Of Cooperation Strategies And Profit Distribution For The Enterprise Alliances With Bidirectional Supply-demand Relationshiip

In the context of globalization, enterprises are faced with opportunities, challengesas well as challenging markets with both cooperation and competition. Supply chainmanagement has become the main form of business competition, the competitiveness ofenterprises and in-depth cooperation relationship between the upstream and downstreamenterprises of supply chain have gradually shifted from simple supply and demandcontractual relationship, the gradual deepening of the mutual sharing of resources,benefit and win-win strategic partnership. This study focus on the inter-relationshipbetween supply and demand in the supply chain enterprises cooperation as the studyissue, in the inter-relationship between supply and demand, how to effectivelycoordinate the interests of all parties on the supply chain and achieve the utmostinterests of the whole, and at the same time, making its members to achieve balanceddevelopment with satisfaction has become the focus.This paper collects previous researches on enterprise alliance cooperationstrategies and profit distribution in the supply chain from domestic and foreign scholars,followed up with corresponding summarization and evaluation. The core issue of theinter-relationship between supply and demand supply chain enterprises, research thecooperation mechanism of Enterprises Alliance. Through the relationship and interestallocation perspective, the present paper is determined to work out the strategiesapplicable to enterprise alliances in a bidirectional supply-demand relationship in termsof cooperation and profit distribution. The paper divides cooperation relationships intothree stages: short-term temporary cooperation model based on market behavior,one-way input type medium-term strategy cooperation mode, and the long-termstrategic cooperation pattern of bidirectional investment. Cooperation strategies willthen be analyzed concerning parties on different cooperation states.Under the short and medium term cooperation mode, participants, as the onlyindependent supplier or demander, share the same goal: achieving their own maximalinterests. But the two cooperation modes have significant differences--the medium termcooperation has stronger stability than the short-term one; the leading enterprises invest in single direction based on their partial trust, while short-term cooperation takes onlymarket as a determining variable. Through the Stackelberg Game model, this presentstudy watches the influence of different strategies on interests of companies on differentcooperation stages. The implementation of long-term cooperation must be based on fullof trust between the parties, supports on technology, capital, and management and evenin the form of mutual investment and equity management. The cooperation goal hasshifted from the pursuit of maximal self-interest to the implementation of stablelong-term cooperation relationships between enterprises with fair and reasonabledistribution of interests, making win-win possible among parties on the bidirectionalsupply chain.The construction of profit distribution among partners on the bidirectional supplychain takes the price increment of respective enterprises as the variables for decisionmaking. Since the medium-term and long-term stage added new ways of cooperationand investment, decision making becomes even more cumbersome than the short termcooperation due to complicated management. Besides the brief analysis of both supplyand demand by means of mathematical calculation about the profit distribution ofenterprise alliance in different cooperation modes, we use the MATLAB softwaresimulation as an example to simulate the rationality of the distribution modelestablished in this paper, and intuitively reflect how variables in decision making affectthe overall interests of respective parties. Through the comparative analysis of theresults from different cooperation stages, references concerning decision-making areprovided for enterprise alliances in bilateral supply-demand chains with participantsbeing both suppliers and demanders.Through this study, it is found that the cooperative enterprise decision-making hasan impact not only on the income of the enterprises themselves, but also can impact itspartners. This research study can provide theoretical references for the bidirectionalcooperative enterprise of the supply relationship management practices.