| In recent years,with the improvement of living standards,the popularization of food safety knowledge and the exposure of food safety events in China,the consumers have preferred high-quality fresh agricultural products.The quality and price of fresh agricultural products are important factors that affect consumers' purchase decisions,the quality input behavior of either member of supply chain influences the pricing strategy and profits of each other,and the circulation loss and random output of fresh agricultural products also affect the pricing of the fresh agricultural products,which will affect the profits of the node enterprises.In view of this,in order to meet the demand of consumers to pursue the high quality and low price of fresh agricultural products,this thesis explores how the dominated enterprises of fresh agricultural products supply chain make decisions in order to improve their own profits and the total profit of fresh agricultural products supply chain at the same time.In this thesis,taking the two-level supply chain of fresh agricultural products composed of the suppliers of fresh agricultural products and a single retailer as the research object,taking the demand of consumers for high quality and low price of fresh agricultural products as the guide,and considering the characteristics of large circulation loss,easy deterioration,random demand and random output of fresh agricultural products,with the aid of methods and research tools such as demand function theory,price theory,game theory,utility theory,optimization theory,supply chain coordination contract theory and numerical calculation,this thesis studies the pricing strategy,bilateral quality control strategy and government subsidy strategy of profit maximization of fresh agricultural products supply chain under different market environment and different dominated subjects.First of all,considering the impact of the quality difference between ordinary fresh agricultural products and green fresh agricultural products on demand,a two-level supply chain game model of fresh agricultural products is established,which is composed of a single retailer and two competitive fresh agricultural products suppliers(ordinary fresh agricultural products supplier and green fresh agricultural products supplier).Considering that the time-varying utility of consumers is affected by green degree,retail price and freshness of agricultural products,this thesis studies the choice of optimal sales model and the pricing strategy of a dominated retailer.Then,a two-level supply chain game model of fresh agricultural products is established,which is composed of a single retailer and a single supplier of fresh agricultural products.Under the conditions of considering that there are substitutions between ordinary fresh agricultural products and green fresh agricultural products produced by an agricultural products supplier,and that market demand is affected by their own price,freshness and the price of alternatives,and that the amount of delivery is influenced by quantity loss,this thesis studies the differential pricing strategy and the coordination contract under the leadership of fresh agricultural products supplier to maximize the profit of fresh agricultural products supply chain.Secondly,based on the mode of only selling ordinary fresh agricultural products or only selling green fresh agricultural products,and in view of the characteristics of demand random of fresh agricultural products,a two-level supply chain game model of fresh agricultural products is established,which is composed of a single retailer and a dominated single fresh agricultural products supplier.Considering that the linear demand function of fresh agricultural products is affected by the bilateral quality control level of supply chain members,the price of fresh agricultural products,and the uncontrollable random factors,and under the condition of considering that the amount of delivery is influenced by quantity loss,this thesis studies the quality input level strategy of the members and the coordination contract under the leadership of fresh agricultural products supplier to maximize the profit of fresh agricultural products supply chain.Finally,based on the mode of only selling ordinary fresh agricultural products or only selling green fresh agricultural products,and in view of the characteristics of natural disasters affecting the output of fresh agricultural products,different government subsidy policies based on "promoting the fresh agricultural products supplier's income increase on the basis of giving priority to maximizing social welfare" are designed in the disaster year,a three-stage Stackelberg game model consisting of a government,a retailer and a fresh agricultural products supplier is established.Under the different background of the dominated retailer owned cooperative preference behavior and no cooperative preference behavior,this thesis studies the choice of optimal subsidy policy of the government,and discusses the impact of the government's different subsidy policies and retailer's cooperative preference behavior on the enterprises' decisions.The main research conclusions are as follows:1.There are some difference of green degree between green fresh agricultural products and ordinary fresh agricultural products supplied by a supplier of green fresh agricultural products and a supplier of ordinary fresh agricultural products respectively,and consumers' time-varying utility is affected by green degree,retail price and freshness of agricultural products,this thesis studies the choice of sales model and the pricing strategy of a dominated retailer,and comparatively analyzes the optimal pricing and profit level under the sales modes of selling ordinary agricultural products,selling green agricultural products,and selling two products at the same time,then discusses the influence of main parameters on optimal strategies and profits.The results show that:(1)when the cost of green degree coefficient is high,the retailer's optimal sales model is to sell ordinary agricultural products;and when the cost of green degree coefficient is low or moderate,(1)if the constraint conditions of selling both products at the same time are satisfied,the retailer's optimal sales model is to sell two products at the same time;(2)otherwise,when the cost of the green degree coefficient is below a threshold,the retailer's optimal sales model is to sell green agricultural products,otherwise,the retailer's optimal sales model is to sell ordinary agricultural products;(2)the optimal pricing and profit level are positively correlated with freshness sensitivity coefficient,and negatively correlated with the price sensitivity coefficient.but the optimal pricing is positively correlated with the cost of green degree coefficient,and the profit level is negatively correlated with it.2.Based on the mode of supplying ordinary fresh agricultural products and green fresh agricultural products by a single fresh agricultural products supplier at the same time,considering that market demand is affected by their own prices,freshness and the prices of alternatives;based on the mode of only supplying ordinary fresh agricultural products or only supplying green fresh agricultural products by a single fresh agricultural products supplier,considering that market demand is affected by the price of fresh agricultural products,the quality input level of upstream and downstream supply chain members and uncontrollable random factors,this thesis establishes a two-level supply chain profit model of fresh agricultural products under the influence of quantity loss in decentralized and centralized decision-making cases,and studies the pricing strategy,the quality input level strategy of the members and the coordination contract under the leadership of fresh agricultural products supplier to maximize the profit of fresh agricultural products supply chain,then discusses the influence of main parameters on optimal strategies and profits.The results show that: the traditional wholesale price contract cannot achieve the coordination of fresh agricultural products supply chain,(1)based on the mode of supplying ordinary fresh agricultural products and green fresh agricultural products at the same time,if the dominated fresh agricultural products supplier lowers the wholesale price to the production cost considering the quantity loss,and as long as the retailer's profit sharing proportion which is provided to the supplier meet a certain constraint,the profit sharing contract can achieve the perfect coordination of supply chain;(2)based on the mode of only supplying ordinary fresh agricultural products or only supplying green fresh agricultural products,if the dominated fresh agricultural products supplier lowers the wholesale price to the production cost considering the quantity loss,and as long as the retailer's profit sharing proportion and preset reserved income meet certain constraints,the profit sharing contract with reserved income can not only realize the coordination of supply chain,but also increases quality control level of each supply chain member.3.Under the background that the retailer has cooperative preference behaviors,based on the characteristics of natural disasters affecting output and a three-stage Stackelberg game model composed of a government,a retailer and a fresh agricultural products supplier,this thesis studies the choice of government's optimal subsidy policy based on "promoting the fresh agricultural products supplier's income increase on the basis of giving priority to maximizing social welfare",and compares and analyzes the effects of different government subsidy policies and the retailer's cooperative preference behavior on the optimal subsidy rate of the government,the optimal purchase price of the retailer,the optimal production input of the fresh agricultural products supplier,and the interests of the three parties and consumer surplus.The results show that: when the probability of "harvest year" is moderate or high(if the retailer owns cooperative preference behavior,the cooperative preference degree of the retailer is lower than a certain critical value),the government's optimal subsidy policy is to provide subsidies to fresh agricultural products supplier,which can realize a win-win situation for the government and consumers,but do not necessarily promote fresh agricultural products supplier's income;otherwise,the government's optimal subsidy policy is to provide subsidies to the retailer,which can achieve a tripartite win-win situation among the government,consumers and fresh agricultural products supplier.In this thesis,the main innovation lies in:1.To explore the influence of quality and price competition on sales model and pricing strategy,greenness and freshness of fresh agricultural products are introduced at the same time.In view of the influence of the differential pricing strategies of fresh agricultural products on the profits of enterprises,the existing research on the vertical master-slave game of fresh agricultural products supply chain rarely involved the influence of the quality and price competition between green fresh agricultural products and ordinary fresh agricultural products on the choice of retailer's sales mode and pricing strategy,and did not consider the influence of greenness,freshness and price of fresh agricultural products on consumer utility at the same time.This thesis introduces the horizontal competition relationship between a green fresh agricultural products supplier and an ordinary fresh agricultural products supplier,and constructs the consumers' time-varying utility function affected by greenness,freshness and price of fresh agricultural products,then establishes the profit function model under different sales modes.The research problem is innovative.2.The influence of quality input level on supply chain system performance is analyzed from the perspective of bilateral quality control and loss rate.In view of the vertical cooperation of upstream and downstream members of fresh agricultural products supply chain,the existing research on the coordination contract to maximize the profits of fresh agricultural products supply chain based on quality control only considered the demand is affected by one member's quality effort level,and also did not consider the characteristics of random demand and quantity loss.This thesis introduces two decision variables of quality input level of two members and constructs the demand function affected by all members' quality effort level,uncontrollable random factors,quantity loss and price,then a more realistic profit function model is established,and the coordination contract is designed to improve the quality input level and realize the profit maximization of the supply chain system,which is innovative from the perspective of research.3.According to different subsidy objects and considering the behavior preference characteristics of the retailer,the government subsidy strategy of fresh supply chain is studied.In view of the improvement of profits and social welfare of fresh supply chain members by the government subsidy policy,most of the studies analyzed the performance of government's subsidy policy from the perspective of profit loss of fresh agricultural products supplier in disaster year,and rarely compared the effect of subsidy policies under different subsidy objects,and did not consider the cooperative preference behavior of supply chain members.This thesis introduces the cooperative preference behavior of retailer,and designs the subsidy policies of providing subsidies to a fresh agricultural products supplier and a dominated retailer in the disaster year,with the goal of "promoting the fresh agricultural products supplier's income increase on the basis of giving priority to maximizing social welfare",and combining with the cooperative preference behavior of the retailer,then studies the choice of optimal subsidy policy of the government.The research problem is innovative. |
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