Study On Knowledge Sharing Strategies In Cooperative Innovation In View Of Employees’ Dual Commitments

In the era of knowledge economy, more and more companies are starting to chooseparticipating in cooperative innovation in order to quickly obtain the necessaryknowledge needed for knowledge innovation, save the cost of innovation, and reducethe risk of innovation. Knowledge-sharing is not only one of the main motives ofcooperative innovation, but also the guarantee for the success of cooperative innovation.Due to the fact that the knowledge exists in the minds of employees, their knowledgesharing behavior determines the efficiency of knowledge sharing in cooperativeinnovation. At the same time, employees involving in cooperative innovation have dualcommitments feature that are company commitment and project commitment, whichhave important influence on their knowledge-sharing behavior. Therefore, it issignificance taking into account the employee’s dual commitments when stimulating thestaff to share knowledge.Firstly, the reason of employee’s dual commitments is analyzed, and theemployees’ are divided into four types from the perspective of project commitment andcompany commitment, namely self-committed employees, project-committedemployees, company-committed employees and dual-high committed employees. Then,the characteristics and knowledge-sharing behavior of each type are dissected.Secondly, taking into account that different types employees possess differentknowledge-sharing behavior, classify management strategies are presented; consideringthat the dual commitments characteristic’s important influence on employee’sknowledge sharing behavior, the polices are proposed in order to improve the staff’scompany commitment and project commitment. Thereby, the knowledge sharing couldbe promoted, and then increase the cooperative innovation project efficiency.Finally, considering the impact of employees’ project commitment on their knowledge-sharingbehavior, the incentive contracts to promote the knowledge-sharing is designed under dualinformation asymmetry of staff’s project commitment and knowledge sharing efforts. After that theoptimal contract menu is obtained, and comparison with the single information asymmetry isconducted. It is shown that, compared with the single information asymmetry, the commission rateof high project-committed employees does not distort under dual information asymmetry, while thelow project-committed employees’ is downward distort. In addition, the high project-committedemployees receive a higher fixed remuneration, and the company proceeds is strictly less than the single information asymmetry situations.